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THE ENDLESS JAIL-TO-HOSPITAL-TO-STREETREPEAT CYCLE DEPRIVES PERSONS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES THE RIGHT TO CONTINUITY OF CARE

NAOMI M. WEINSTEINt & MICHAEL L.
PERLINtt

I. INTRODUCTION

O

ver thirty years ago, the late Professor Bruce Winick called
our attention to "the well-known chain of events [involving
criminal defendants with mental disabilities] from incompetency
determination to hospital to stabilization to return to jail to
decompensation to re-determination of incompetency to rehospitalization several times."' Some seventeen years ago, one of
the authors of this article, Professor Emeritus Michael L. Perlin,
noted how psychiatric hospital commitments of this population
"are frequently followed by a 'shuttle process' by which defendants
are stabilized, returned to jail to await trial, and returned to the
hospital following relapse." 2 A decade ago, a trial judge in
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Service.) naomi.weinstein@gmail.com.
tt.
Professor Emeritus of Law, New York Law School. Founding Director,
International Mental Disability Law Reform Project. Co-founder, Mental Disability Law
and Policy Associates. michael.perlin@nyls.edu. Both authors would like to thank Henry
Dlugacz for his invaluable help. Portions of this paper were presented in Nov. 2017, at the
annual conference of the American Criminology Society, in Philadelphia, PA, and at the
Forensic Psychiatry Grand Rounds Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania in March
2018.
1. BruceJ. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 934
n.52 (1985) (internal citations omitted).
2. Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw" The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalizationof Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities,52 ALA. L. REv. 193, 204
(2000); see also Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REv. 313, 320 n.56 (2009) (citing Shauhin Talesh, MentalHealth Court
Judges As Dynamic Risk Managers:A New Conceptualizationof the Role ofJudges, 57 DEPAUL L.
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Vermont outlined the problem succinctly: "Discharge into the
community without planning or supervision is likely to result in a
repetition of the cycle of violent offense, incarceration, overt signs
of mental illness in jail, commitment, and reduced or largely
absent signs of mental illness in the hospital which has marked
[the defendant's] adult life." 3
Just three years ago, a student note came to the same
conclusions, noting that members of this cohort "continue to
cycle in and out of mental hospitals." 4 Likewise, earlier this year
former President Barack Obama noted the existence of "a
relatively small number of highly vulnerable individuals [who]
cycle repeatedly not just through local jails, but also hospital
5
emergency rooms, shelters, and other public systems."
In short, the way we criminalize behavior that
disproportionally affects people with mental illness is a problem
that has not gone away, and is one that any of us who take
seriously the entire bundle of issues that are raised by this
phenomenon-how we treat this population; how we fail to learn
from our history of failure; how we ignore options that might
potentially ameliorate the underlying situation; how we demand
quick fixes, and ignore the "long game"-must take equally
seriously.6 This shuttling or cycling is bad for many reasons, not
least of which is the way that it deprives the cohort of individuals at
risk from any meaningful continuity of care and how it
exacerbates the problems caused by the unnecessary and
counterproductive arrests of persons with mental disabilities for

REV. 93, 101-02 (2007) (emphasizing how prisoners cycle in and out of the criminal
justice system and rarely receive hospital treatment while incarcerated).
3. State v. Swift, No. 1191-8-00 Wncr, 175-5-04 Oecr, 2006 WL 2627322 (VL Dist. CL
Mar. 24, 2006).
4. Renee Gruber, Note, A Civil Prison-Fearor Reason? UnbiasedReform of Involuntary
Commitment Proceedingsfor Non-CriminalsAdmitted into Mental Facilities,90 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 203, 211 (2013).
5. Barack Obama, The President's Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811, 848 (2017); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: LAUNCHING THE
DATA-DRIVEN JUSTICE INITIATIVE: DISRUPTING THE CYCLE OF INCARCERATION

(June 30,

2016), www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/30/fact-sheet-launc
hing-data-driven-justice-initiative-dirupting-cycle.
6. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail" Using Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceto Remediate the Criminalizationof Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U.J.
MED. & L. 343 (2013).

2018]

THE RIGHT TO CONTINUITY OF CARE

457

"nuisance" crimes. 7 By the phrase "continuity of care," we adopt
the definition offered by Bruce Frederick: "1) continuity of
control, 2) continuity in the range of services, 3) continuity in
service and program content, 4) continuity of social environment,
and 5) continuity of attachment."8 Beyond this, continuity of care
requires "effective interagency and provider communication to
share information, facilitate access, and integrate care across
providers and settings,"9 and the "development of caring,
respectful relationships with caregivers so that needs are identified
and consumers are engaged in care."'°
Continuity of care further requires: (1) treatment in
facilities that prepare offenders for reentry into the specific
communities to which they will return, (2) making the necessary
arrangements and linkages with people, groups and agencies in
the community that relate to known risk and protective factors,
and (3) ensuring the delivery of required services and
supervision.11 Without this continuity, it is far less likely that any
therapeutic intervention will have any long-lasting ameliorative
effect.

12

7. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "To Wander Off in Shame":
Deconstructing the Shaming and Shameful Arrest Policies of Urban Police Departments in Their
Treatment of Persons with Mental Disabilities,in SYSTEMIC HUMILIATION INAMERICA: FINDING
DIGNITY WITHIN SYSTEMS OF DEGRADATION 175 (Daniel Rothbart ed. 2018) [hereinafter
To Wander Off]; Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, "Life's Hurried Tangled Road": A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Why Dedicated Counsel Must Be Assigned to Represent
Persons with Mental Disabilities in Community Settings, 35 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 353 (2017);
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Had to Be Held Down by Big Police": A Therapeutic
JurisprudencePerspective on Interactions Between Police and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685 (2016) [hereinafter Big Police].
8. David M. Altschuler & Troy L. Armstrong, Juvenile Corrections and Continuity of
Care in a Community Context-The Evidence and PromisingDirections, 66 FED. PROB. 72, 73
(Sept. 2002) (citing BRUCE FREDERICK, FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO RECIDMSM AMONG
YOUTH WITH THE NEWYORK STATE DIVISION FORYOUTH 20-21 (1999)).
9. Rebecca Spain Broches, Creating Continuity: Improving the Quality of Mental Health
Care Provided to Justice-Involved New Yorkers, 21 GEO. J. ON POvERTY L. & POL'Y 91, 100
(2013) (quoting Janet Durbin et al., Continuity of Care: Validation of a New Self-Report
Measurefor Individuals Using Mental Health Services, 31 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 279,
280 (2004)).
10. Id. at 100 (quoting Durbin et al., supra note 9, at 280).
11. See generally Durbin et al., supra note 9, at 293.
12. Related to this are other ploys used by state prison systems that thwart authentic
continuity of care efforts: the retention of persons in prisons after their conditional
release dates in residential treatment facilities, see, e.g., People ex rel. Green v.
Superintendent of Sullivan Corr. Facility, 25 N.Y.S.3d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); or the
transfer of some of this cohort of individuals to state hospitals via what is known as the
"two PC" method of commitment; for a prototypical example, see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
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Our current system fails to meet any of these prescriptive
standards, and as long as the state of affairs remains the same we
are doomed to decades more of scholarship and case law-by law
professors, judges, students and former Presidents-appropriately
decrying what has happened.1 3 The current system, in addition to
being utterly counter-productive (and in many ways destructive), is
also violative of the constitutional right to treatment and the
statutory right to non-discrimination as provided in human rights
law both domestically (the Americans with Disabilities Act)
("ADA") and internationally (the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities) ("CRPD").
This article will first discuss the current state of affairs.
Then, we will review the valid and reliable research as to why
continuity of care, which is clinically necessary, is so often missing
and how the failure to provide this continuity leads to the
problems we currently face. We then set out the legal arguments,
constitutional and statutory, that we believe need to be relied on
to remediate the current situation. In this context, we will also
discuss the implications of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 1 4 the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"),"

5

and Medicaid regulations"

for the population in question, and consider the viability of using
advance psychiatric directives. 7 After this, we show how our
current system violates every precept of therapeutic jurisprudence,

§ 9.27 (McKinney 2011) ("Involuntary admission on medical certification."). On the
double stigmatization of this population in general, see Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.
Lynch, "Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair".-Risk, Security, Danger, the
Constitution, and the Clinician's Dilemma, 5 IND. J.L. & Soc. EQUAL. 409, 410 (2017);
Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 398-99 (1992) (quoting Ellen
Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed? The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant, 14 CRiM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 251 (1987)).
13. One of the co-authors, Michael L. Perlin, represented this cohort of individuals
in the 1970s-1980s; the other co-author, Naomi M. Weinstein, has represented like
cohorts since the late 2000s. Our discussions of what we have observed have revealed
similar situations.
14. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 29
U.S.C. § 1181 (2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3 0 0 gg (2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d (2011).
15. Patient and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
16. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human
Services, 42 C.F.R. § 400 (2017).
17. On the use of such directives in general in this context, see Michael L. Perlin &
Naomi M. Weinstein, "SaidI, 'But You Have No Choice'". Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a
Client's Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even ifIt Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen,
15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 73,106-08 (2016/2017).
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as well as the basic principles of international human rights law,
and argue for the enhanced use of mental health courts. We
conclude by offering some suggestions that, we believe, will
ameliorate the current situation.
Our title comes from Bob Dylan's brilliant song, Visions of
Johanna,1" and comes from this couplet: "The peddler now speaks
to
the
countess
who's pretending to care for him/
Sayin', 'Name me someone that's not a parasite and I'll go out and
say a prayer for him""' 9 Visions ofJohanna is universally seen as one
of Dylan's greatest songs, an "undisputed master-work," according
to eminent Dylanologist Oliver Trager.2 ° In part, the song is about
nightmares and hallucinations. 2
This couplet has been
characterized by as a reflection of Dylan's "hunger for the
authentic,"2 2 although the countess figure demonstrates only a
"pretense of care."23 We chose this-admittedly, ambiguous-lyric
to use in our article title for several reasons: first, the economic
and social status contrast between the "peddler" and the
"countess" parallels the contrast between the status of the
marginalized persons of whom we write" and the power of the
state; second, we believe that our rejection of the importance of
continuity of care demonstrates the reality that the state is only
"pretending to care" for those of whom we write; and third, this
population is seen, unfortunately, as "parasit[ic] ," and thus, of less
25
value than others.
18.
19.

BOB DYLAN, Visions ofJohanna, on BLONDE ON BLONDE (Dwarf Music 1966).
Id. at 5:42-5:59 (emphasis added).

20.

OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINtrIvE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA

653 (Bob Nirkind & Marian Appellof eds., 2004).
21. ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MuSIC OF BOB DYLAN
213 (1997). One of the co-authors, Michael L. Perlin, has drawn on Visions for a title lyric
once before. See Michael L. Perlin, "Infinity Goes up on Trial" Sanism, Pretextuality, and the
Representation of Defendants with Mental Disabilities,16 QUT L. REV. 106 (2016).
22. MIKE MARQUSEE, WICKED MESSENGER: BOB DYLAN AND THE 1960s, at 207 (2011).
23. Tony Attwood, Visions of Johanna: The Meaning of the Music, the Lyrics and the
Rewites, UNTOLD DYLAN (Nov. 1, 2008), http://bob-dylan.org.uk/archives/7. In the same
paper, Attwood suggests that the "cynical peddler [is] the drug supplier, representing a
false escape from reality." Id.
24. It should be no surprise to any reader that U.S. incarceration policies, in this
specific context as in others, have a disproportionate impact on other marginalized
populations-African-Americans and Latinos. See Nicholas Freudenberg, Jails, Prisons, and
the Health of Urban Populations:A Review of the Impact of the CorrectionalSystem on Community
Health, 78J. URB. HEALTH 214, 214-15 (2001).
25. In one analysis of Visions, a critic has connected the song to George Jackson, a
'naturalistic tale of fury that recounts the prison death of Jackson, a Black Panther who
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organizations to support systemic change to make the success of
such intervention-based programs more likely.49
For such programs to be successful, initially there must be
a critical assessment of the mental health services typically
available in a correctional institution,5 ° an assessment that must be
carried out in light of the "overarching resistance to considering
rehabilitation" as a primary goal of corrections.5 ' Dlugacz and a
colleague note ruefully that this attitude contributes to the
"isolation" that care providers in correctional settings often
experience, and that it further "reinforces the disconnection of
care and inadequate attention to clinically oriented reentry
programs in clinical settings."5 2 Moreover, a proper assessment of
the needs of inmates in this context requires an "interdisciplinary
and integrated approach that includes the active participation of
the individual, custody staff, family and treatment providers."5
Only in this way can we ever actualize this "core function" of
correctional mental health.54
III.

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Mental illness affects approximately 44 million adults in the
United States alone, or about one in five Americans. 55 There are
currently over 40,000 persons with mental illness institutionalized
in psychiatric hospitals across the country.5 6 It is estimated that in

49. Id. On the different models of assessment, treatment and supervision of
offenders with mental illness in efforts to minimize recidivism, see Evan M. Lowder et al.,
Models of ProtectionAgainst Recidivism injustice-Involved Adults with Mental Illness, 44 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 893 (2017) (demonstrating empirical support for the role of protective
factors in risk assessment and management of adult offenders with mental illness).
50. Dlugacz & Roskes, supra note 43, at 396.
51. Id. at 400.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 410; see also id. at 423 ("In our view, preparing incarcerated inmates and
detainees for release requires as much integration as possible.").
54. Id. at 425.
55. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE

2014 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.samhsa.g
ov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR1-2014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf (showing that in
2014 43.6 million adults in the U.S. reportedly suffered from "any mental illness"
("AMI"), of whom 9.8 million suffered from "serious mental illness" ("SMI")).
56. American FactFinder,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/ta
bleservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC 10 SF1_PCT20&prodType= table (last
visited May 12, 2018) (providing table of U.S. population living in "Group Quarters"
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We have chosen to write this article in an effort to make it
more likely that the population about which we are concerned will
be seen as having the same value as all others, and that policies
(both official and unwritten) be restructured so as to provide the
level of clinical care needed by this population in ways that
comport with constitutional, statutory, and international human
rights law, and with the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence.
II. ON

CONTINUITY OF CARE

A. Introduction
As previously stated, the concept of continuity of care
includes continuity of control, of services, of program content, of
social environment, and of attachment.2 6 It requires re-entry
preparation, the creation of community linkages, and insurance
that the required services will be delivered.2 7 There is no question
that the lack of continuity of mental health services2" severely
impairs the ability of community-based mental health providers to
have any therapeutic impact on this population.2 9 Henry Dlugacz
and Luna Droubi state the problem succinctly: "While
incarcerated, many of these people received inadequate treatment
and deficient, if any, reentry planning. Once released to the

was a major figure in radical racial politics in the late 1960s, and whose prison letters
evidenced the systemic racist brutality of the American prison system." Michael L. Perlin,
Tangled Up in Law: The Jurisprudence of Bob Dylan, 38 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1395, 1412-14
(2011) (citing Mark Jones, Visions of Visions ofJohanna,www.marknjones.com/visions-of vi
sions-ofjohanna.pdf; and DYLAN, supra note 18) (concluding "[s]ome of us are
prisoners, the rest of us are guards").
26. Altschuler & Armstrong, supra note 8, at 73.
27. Id.
28. This should not be read to imply that only mental health services should be "at
play" here. See, e.g., Emily A. Wang et al., EngagingIndividuals Recently Released from Prison
into Primary Care: A Randomized Trial, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 22, 27 (2012) (describing
the importance of continuity of care for released older prisoners with chronic medical
conditions).
29. David Katner, The MentalHealth Paradigmand the MacArthur Study: EmergingIssues
Challenging the Competence ofJuveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 503, 549
(2006); see also T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarcerationfor Persons with
Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 296
(1997) ("Lack of coordination ... may jeopardize continuity of care for persons who
attempt to access these services.").
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community, many received insufficient support and subsequently
30
were incarcerated.
Failures in treatment are frequently attributed, at least in
part, to discontinuity3 ' and to lack of coordination. 2 There is little
consistency in approach, and there is a lack of understanding as to
the scope of protections that must be provided. 3 For years, both
the prevalence of medical errors arising in cases in which there
discontinuity of care3 4 and the fact that our incarceration policies
have had unintended adverse health consequences have been wellknown.3 5 The range of negative outcomes includes, but is not
limited to, having no permanent residence post-release and a
3 6
suicide rate eight times higher than the general population.
It is indisputable that there is a positive impact when
models of care are in place, 37 and that such models improve postrelease engagement with mental health services.3 ' There is now
widespread agreement that transition planning is essential to
facilitating continuity of care for soon-to-be released inmates with
30. Henry A. Dlugacz & Luna Droubi, The Reach and Limitation of the ADA and Its
IntegrationMandate: Implicationsfor the Successful Reentry ofIndividuals with Mental Disabilities
in a CorrectionalPopulation,35 BEHAV. SC.. & L. 135, 139 (2017).
31. Wade Askew, Keeping Promises to Preserve Promise: The Necessity of Committing to a
RehabilitationModel in theJuvenileJustice System, 20 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 373, 386
(2013).
32. See Sean K. Sayers et al., Connecting Mentally Ill Detainees in Large UrbanJails with
Community Care, 88 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 323, 329 (2016) (stressing the need for greater
information sharing and collaboration with community mental health agencies to
minimize jail use and to facilitate successful community reentry tor detainees with severe
mental illness).
33. Dlugacz & Droubi, supra note 30, at 143.
34. Carlton Moore et al., Medical ErrorsRelated to Discontinuity of Carefrom an Inpatient
to an Outpatient Setting, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 646, 646 (2003) (showing there was
error found in forty-nine percent of cases involving discontinuity of care; the prevalence
of medical errors related to the discontinuity of care from the inpatient to the outpatient
setting "high" and "may be associated with an increased risk of rehospitalization").
35. Nicholas Freudenberg & Daliah Heller, A Review of Opportunities to Improve the
Health of People Involved in the CriminalJustice System in the United States, 37 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 313 (2016).

36. ManuelaJarrett et al., Continuity of Carefor Recently Released Prisonerswith Mental
Illness: A Pilot Randomised Controlled Trial Testing the Feasibility of a Critical Time Intervention,
21 EPIDEMIOLOGY& PSYCHIATRIC SCI. 187 (2012).

37. Brian McKenna et al., Mental Health Care and Treatment in Prisons: A New
Paradigm to Support Best Practice,16 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2017) (citing Krishna Pillai et
al., From Positive Screen to Engagement in Treatment: A Preliminary Study of the Impact of a New
Model of Carefor Prisonerswith Serious Mental Illness, 16 BMC PSYCHIATRY 1, 6 (2016)).
38. Id. (citing Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Release from Prison- A High Risk of Death
for FormerInmates, 356 NEw ENG.J. MED. 157, 164 (2007)).
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mental illness,3 9 and that correctional systems can have a "direct
effect" on the health of urban populations by linking inmates to
urban services after release.4" Of course, forensic practitioners will
need new skills to make sure that continuity is in fact provided.4"

Additionally, it goes without saying that implementation requires
"political and constituent support and investment of resources. 42
B. Role of CorrectionalFacilities
Correctional facilities must engage in clinically-oriented

reentry programs.43 In addition to access to health care services, as
part of a successful re-entry program, ex-prisoners must also have
access to meaningful peer mentoring programs, 44 supported
employment, and supported housing. 5 As Henry Dlugacz has
stressed, successful reentry programs-programs that are
collaborative as between the criminal justice system and the
behavioral health system46-must be a "primary focus of
correctional mental health care, [and] not an afterthought."4 7

While the scope of obstacles to successful programs may be
"daunting," 4

it

is

incumbent

upon

existing

professional

39. Jacques Baillargeon et al., Addressing the Challenge of Community Reentry Among
Released Inmates with Serious Mental Illness, 46 AM.J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 361,368 (2010).
40. Freudenberg, supra note 24, at 214.
41. Jamie O'Donahoo & Janette Graetz Simmonds, Forensic Patients and Forensic
Mental Health in Victoria:Legal Context, ClinicalPathways, and Practice Challenges, 69 AUSTL.
SOC. WORK 169 (2016).
42. Broches, supra note 9, at 122.
43. Henry A. Dlugacz & Eric Roskes, Clinically Oriented Reentry Planning, in
HANDBOOK ON CORRECrIONAL MENTAL HEALTH 395, 424 (Charles L. Scott ed., 2010).
44. LaVerne D. Miller, Reentry as Part of the Recovery Process, in REENTRY PLANNING
FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS: POLICY AND PRACTICE 10-2 (Henry Dlugacz ed.,

2010).
45. Jeffrey Draine & Daniel Herman, CriticalTime Interuention, in REENTRY PLANNING
FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS: POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 6-1.
46. Henry A. Dlugacz, Community Re-entry Preparation/Coordination,in OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL PSYCHIATRY 76-77 (Robert L. Trestman et al. eds.,
2015) [hereinafter Dlugacz, Community Re-entry Preparation/Coordination]; Henry A.
Dlugacz et al., Implementing Reentry-Establishinga Continuum of Care of Adult Jail and Prison
Releases with Mental Illness, in CORRECTIONAL PSYCHIATRY: PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND
STRATEGIES 12-1 (OleJ. Thienhaus & Melissa Piasecki eds., 2007).
47. Dlugacz, Community Re-entry Preparation/Coordination,
supra note 46, at 76.
48. Id. at 77.
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the United States fourteen and a half percent of male adults in
prisons and jails have a mental illness, as do thirty-one percent of
female adults-a rate of two to four times that of the general
population, 57 with some studies concluding that over half of
inmates have been diagnosed with mental illness or are receiving
58
treatment for a mental health-related issue.
Jail staff workers often have no education or training in the
appropriate treatment of detainees with a mental illness, and thus
may respond with aggressive measures that ultimately exacerbate
symptoms of the detainees' conditions,5 9 and it is therefore no
surprise that thirty percent of inmates in solitary confinement are
mentally ill."° Suicide is the leading cause of death in both jails
and prisons, and research suggests that the high suicide rates are
correlated with untreated depression.6 1 In 2015, a quarter of all
police shooting deaths involved persons with signs of a mental
illness.62 These startling statistics show that continuity of care is a
pressing need for persons with mental illness who are subject to

organized by type, listing total U.S. population in psychiatric hospitals and units as
42,035).
57. Henry Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness AmongJail Inmates, 60
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 761, 761 (2009); see also Christina Canales, Prisons: The New Mental
Health System, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1725 (2012), as discussed in this context in Perlin, supra
note 6, at 345; Edward Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Mentally Ill Individuals in Jails and
Prisons 46 CRIME &JUST. 231 (2017). See generally Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary:
Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391 (2006)
58. See U.S.: Number of Mentally Ill in PrisonsQuadrupled, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 5,
2006, 8:00 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/09/05/s-number-mcntally-ill-prisons quadrupled.
59. Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might Have Drugs at Your
Command" Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the
Perspectives of InternationalHuman Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 381,
396 (2015).
60. Michael L. Perlin, "God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son" Why the Insanity Defense
and the Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles of TherapeuticJurisprudence,54 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
477, 508 (2017) (citing Jessica Knowles, "The Shameful Wall of Exclusion". How Solitary
Confinementfor Inmates with Mental Illness Violates the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 90 WASH.
L. REv. 893, 907 (2015)).
61. Freudenberg, supra note 24, at 221. Half of all prison suicides are committed by
persons with serious mental illness. Kanya D'Almeida, In US Prisons, PsychiatricDisability Is
Often Met by Brute Force, TRUTHOUT (July 18, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.truthout.org/news/item/31886-in-us-prisons-psychiatric-disability-is-often-met-by-brute-force#.
62. 995 People Shot Dead by Police in 2015, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.c
om/graphics/national/police-shooings (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) (providing a database
of fatal police shootings nationwide in 2015 with data showing 257 of those killed had
signs of mental illness).
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the shuttling process between hospitals and prisons that is so
disruptive to actual treatment.
63
A. Impacts of Deinstitutionalization

Deinstitutionalization refers not just to the release and
reduction in numbers of persons who are institutionalized in
psychiatric hospitals, but also to the "diversion of potential new
admissions to alternative facilities, and the development of special
services for the care of a noninstitutionalized mentally ill
population."6 4 It was spurred by technological advancements in
drug therapy, economic incentives to shift care to communitybased outpatient facilities, and changing societal attitudes
regarding mental illness.65 Several landmark Supreme Court cases
guaranteed due process protections for persons with mental
illness, applying the due process and equal protection clauses to
institutionalization
in psychiatric institutions,6 6 ruling it
unconstitutional to indefinitely civilly commit a person without a
finding of dangerousness 67 and articulating a right to the least
68
restrictive alternative in institutionalization decision-making.
Other federal courts have guaranteed the right to treatment 69 and
the right to refuse treatment.

70

Deinstitutionalization is often seen as the reason for the
current state of affairs; 71 yet the greatest problems stem from the

63.

See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY

LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 10-4 (3d ed. 2017). For an earlier consideration, see Michael
L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28
Hous. L. REV. 63 (1991).

64.

H. Richard Lamb & Leona L. Bachrach, Some Perspectives on Deinstitutionalization,

52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1039, 1039 (2001).

65. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the
Deinstitutionalizationof Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 53, 65 (2011).
66. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see also Backstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966).
67. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
68. Olmstead v. LC, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
69.

E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971),

affd sub nom.,

Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1983).
71. See, e.g., Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting, in part, E.
FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS

11 (1997)).
For a substantial minority ...deinstitutionalization has been a psychiatric
Titanic. Their lives are virtually devoid of "dignity" or "integrity of body,
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lack of adequate and accessible community resources for persons
with mental illness. 72 This has led to many people with mental
illness becoming homeless, 73 and thus easily jailed for minor
offenses such as trespassing, disturbing the peace, or disorderly
conduct.74 Further, police may be more inclined to use the
criminal justice process over the civil commitment process because
medical providers may refuse to civilly commit someone or release
the person in a short period of time. In contrast, the criminal
justice system is much more onerous and, in some instances,
almost guarantees a longer period where the person is not in the
community. 75 Police also use these tactics because it is easier and
77
6
quicker for them to do so, 7 and because of stereotypical beliefs

mind, and spirit." "Self-determination" often means merely that the
person has a choice of soup kitchens. The "least restrictive setting"
frequently turns out to be a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a terror-filled
existence plagued by both real and imaginary enemies.
Id. On this point, we endorse the conclusions of Professor Samuel Bagenstos that
"deinstitutionalization has been a success in many significant respects." Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Past and Future of DeinstitutionalizationLitigation, 34 CARDoZO L. REv. 1, 7
(2012).
72. See Lamb & Bachrach, supra note 64, at 1041. On the need to balance
community protection and individual healing in community mental health ventures, see
Philip T. Yanos et al., Community Protection Versus Individual Healing: Two Traditions in
Community Mental Health, 35 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 288, 300 (2017) (recommending that the
community mental health system be "more honest with itself" as to what the "common
good" is that it is designed to promote).
73. It must be emphasized that deinstitutionalization is not the primary cause of
homelessness. See generally, Perlin, supra note 63.
74. Destiny Howell, The Unintended Consequences of Deinstitutionalization,54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. ONLINE 17, 20 (2017); see also BruceJ. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 107, 124 ("Arrest, [for people with
untreated mental illnesses who have committed minor offenses], is inappropriate because
the real problem is not criminality, but untreated mental illness."). See generally Lynch &
Perlin, Big Police, supra note 7, at 687 n.8.
75. Risdon N. Slate, Deinstitutionalization, Criminalization of Mental Illness, and the
Principleof TherapeuticJurisprudence,26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 341, 348-49 (2017).
76. E.g., Randy Borum et al., Police Perspectives on Responding to Mentally Ill People in
Crisis: Perceptions of Program Effectiveness, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (1998) (as discussed in
Perlin, supra note 6, at 351 n.41).
77. See generally Camille Gear Rich & Elyn R. Saks, Introduction:Beating Mental Illness
Symposium, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299 (2017) (discussing symposium entitled Beating
Mental Illness: A Dialogue on Race, Gender, and Disability Stereotypes in Police Use of Force Cases,
held in 2016 at the University of Southern California).
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that persons with mental disabilities cannot be reasoned with and
78
are incapable of conducting a meaningful conversation.
Another factor to consider is the privatization of the
mental health system. 79 Managed care has restricted what services
are covered including psychotropic medication as well as medical
benefits that are typically lost when a person with mental illness is
incarcerated. 0 While psychiatric hospitals have fewer beds today,
the largest mental health facilities are now found in urban jails in
8
Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago. '
It is necessary to consider all of this in the context of the
research done by Professor Jennifer Skeem and her colleagues,
who recommend three policy priorities: (1) identifying offenders
for whom mental illness directly causes criminal behavior; (2)
identifying "evidence-based corrections," including, isolating "the
ingredients of existing programs that reduce recidivism;" and (3)
assessing and addressing system bias, whether this bias is
"motivated by fear or paternalism."'8 2 By identifying these key
areas, unnecessary incarceration and institutionalization for
persons with mental illness can be avoided.
B. Conditionsof Confinement
Persons with mental disabilities are disproportionately
involuntarily committed to institutions where they are deprived of
their freedom, dignity, and basic human rights. 8 3 Even in the
United States, persons with mental disabilities are still frequently
housed in institutions that shock the conscience and humiliate

78. Robert Panzarella & Justin 0. Alicea, Police Tactics in Incidents with Mentally
Disturbed Persons, 20 POLICING 326, 335-36 (1997) (as discussed in Lynch & Perlin, Big
Police,supra note 7, at 703).
79. Slate, supra note 75, at 350.
80. Id. at 352.
81. Freudenberg, supra note 24, at 220; see also Lynch & Perlin, Big Police, supra note
7, at 685 ("It is a truism that the nation's largest urban jails are the largest mental health
facilities in the nation.").
82. Jennifer L. Skeem et al., CorrectionalPolicyfor Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating
a New Paradigmfor Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 120-22 (2011) (as
discussed in Perlin, supra note 6, at 371). In this context, consider also, Mulvey &
Schubert, supra note 57, at 234 ("The vast majority of cases involving mentally ill
individuals in the criminal justice system do not mirror those seen in the media. Most
mentally ill people in the criminal justice system did not get there as a result of psychiatric
deterioration precipitating crime or violence.").
83. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 63, § 3-3.1, at 3-18-23.
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those incarcerated there. 4 This isolation leads to feelings of
shame and can discourage treatment.8 5 Institutional settings
include not just psychiatric hospitals, but also adult homes,
nursing homes, and prisons.8 6 The process of transferring
individuals from psychiatric hospitals to such other facilities is
known as "transinstitutionalization," which can be defined as "the
transfer of a population from one institutional system to another
as an inadvertent consequence of policies intended to
deinstitutionalize the target population."87
Prisons and jails are often not properly equipped to handle
persons with mental disabilities because they were never meant to
function as mental health facilities.8 8 They are "crippled by
understaffing, insufficient facilities, limited programs, and the
restrictions imposed on them by prison rules and prison
culture."8 9 In many instances, prisoners with mental illness who
refuse to comply with orders are subject to physical force such as
chemical sprays, electric shocks, and long-term physical
restraints. 90 Inmates with mental health conditions are at a higher
risk of being victims of violence and displaying more violent
behavior compared to inmates without disabilities. 9' "The absence
of timely and effective reasonable accommodations, as well as the
lack of effective communications and physical accessibility,
significantly increases the likelihood of present and future injury
and illness facing prisoners with disabilities."9 2 The shame that
these individuals experience as a result of the loss of their rights
and liberties is rarely, if ever, discussed even though it is readily

84. Id.
85. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, "Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the
Woman of Shame" Thinking About the Law, Shame, and Humiliation,24 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc.
JUST. 1, 29 (2014).
86. See Dominic A. Sisti et al., Improving Long-term Psychiatric Care: Bring Back the
Asylum, 313JAMA 243, 243 (2015).
87. Lois Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773, 805 (1988).
88. Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, A Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons As
Facilitiesfor theMentally 114 22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 135, 136 (2006).
89. Id. at 137.
90.
91.
92.

Howell, supra note 74, at 21.
Peter Blanck, Disability in Prison,26 S. CAL. INTERDISc. LJ. 309, 314 (2017).
Id.
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acknowledged after the fact by individuals who have faced these
circumstances.

93

The policies implemented in jails and prisons have both
direct and indirect consequences on urban communities.9 4 The
results include reduced employability of young men, precipitated
homeless, destabilized neighborhoods, disrupted family life, all
leading to disenfranchisement and negatively impacted mental
health. 95 Providing appropriate mental health treatment in jails
and prisons can reduce the negative impacts of incarceration by
"[1] minimizing mental health problems suffered as a result of
incarceration; [2] minimizing conflicts among inmates and
between inmates and correctional staff; and [3] reducing
substantially the post-release risk for recidivism of inmates with
serious mental disorders."9 6
C. New York PoliciesAs an Example
We turn here to the situation in New York, as that state is a
good example of what happens when continuity of care issues
emerge, despite the best efforts of some state and city agencies to
prevent the cycle in question. The issues in New York are not
unique, as the same issues persistently arise in other jurisdictions
throughout the country.9 7 We will look at New York through the
filter of a recent case (partially litigated by one of the co-authors,
Naomi M. Weinstein) that illustrates the problems of continuity of
care.

93. To Wander Off, supra note 7. Such shame permeates all systems. See, e.g., Heather
Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Dignity and Preventing Shame and Humiliationby
Improving the Quality and Education of Attorneys in Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Civil
Commitment Cases, 28 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2017); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.
Lynch, She's Nobody's Child/The Law Can't Touch Her at All: Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal
ProceedingsInvolvingJuveniles,56 FAM. CT. REV. 79 (2018).
94. Freudenberg, supra note 24, at 222.
95. Id. at 223-25.
96. James R.P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons:Legal, Clinical,
and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 109, 118 (1994); see also Mulvey & Schubert,
supra note 57, at 231 ("[Recommending these solutions] expand the reach of standard
and innovative mental health services, divert mentally ill individuals early in the criminal
justice process, enrich training of criminal justice personnel, use data more effectively,
and promote interdisciplinary aftercare programs for people with mental illness when
they are released from jails and prisons.").
97. Joseph P. Morrissey eL al, The Role of Medicaid Enrollment and Outpatient Service
Use in Jail Recidivism Among Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 794
(2007).
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Billy98 was a patient in a long-term state psychiatric hospital.
While at the unit, he assaulted a staff member, and was given a
desk appearance ticket."9 Two months later, Billy was arraigned on
the misdemeanor assault charge. For the first criminal court
appearance, Billy was brought to the state trial court in the custody
of hospital peace officers and was returned to the hospital
thereafter. At Billy's next court appearance, he "acted out" in
court, 10 0 and the judge remanded him to jail instead of returning
him to the custody of the state hospital.' While in jail, Billy
decompensated (he stopped taking his psychiatric medication and
began exhibiting symptoms of his mental illness including
displaying paranoia and aggressive behaviors). During this time he
was waiting for an evaluation to determine whether he was
competent to stand trial.
Eventually, Billy was transferred to the jail psychiatric ward
where he was treated with medication over his objection." ' Over
the course of several months, Billy was evaluated twice to
determine if he was competent to stand trial.10 3 Consequently, he
was found incompetent to stand trial, and his misdemeanor assault
98. A pseudonym.
99. A desk appearance ticket is issued in lieu of detention for misdemeanors,
violations, and certain Class "E" felonies for hospitalized prisoners. It is an order to
appear in New York City Criminal Court for arraignment It allows the person to remain
in the community until they are scheduled to appear in court for arraignment. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.20 (McKinney 2004).
100. Billy allegedly tried to reach for a court officer's weapon.
101. In other situations, had Billy not been "remanded" into jail, he would have been
"released on his own recognizance"; however, since, he was brought in the custody of the
Office of Mental Health and still subject to a civil status at the state hospital, he would
have been brought back to that state hospital. Even if Billy had tried to challenge his civil
inpatient legal status, it would have been unlikely that he would have been released to the
community at that point based on his actions in court. This was an unusual disposition,
complicated by the fact that Billy displayed alarming behavior in court.
102. This objection raises the issue of the constitutional rights of a defendant awaiting
an IST finding to avoid unintended side effects and the potentially legally prejudicial side
effects of medication. See, e.g., Perlin & Schriver, supra note 59, at 402 n.123.
103. In New York, the process of raising competency to stand trial is governed by N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730 (known as fitness to proceed). Under that statute, the prosecutor,
defense, or court can raise competency as an issue. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
730 (McKinney 2011). For persons charged with misdemeanors and who are found
incapacitated to stand trial, a final order of observation is issued, the charges are
dismissed and the person is sent to a psychiatric hospital for an evaluation to determine if
they meet inpatient civil commitment. Id. § 730.40. For persons charged with felonies and
found incapacitated to stand trial, a temporary order of observation is issued and he
person is sent to a secure psychiatric facility and treated until the person regains capacity,
subject to periodic court review of the person's continued confinement. Id. § 730.50.
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charge was dismissed; he was the sent back to the same state
psychiatric hospital from which he had come for an evaluation to
determine if he met inpatient civil commitment under New York
Mental Hygiene Law Article 9.104
The irony of Billy's case is that he had spent more time in
jail than he ever would have served if he had pled guilty to the
misdemeanor, 1°5 and, in the end, he was institutionalized in the
same facility from which this saga began where he started about
four months prior. This highlights some of the issues surrounding
the decision as to whether or not to raise the incompetency status,
and why a competent defense attorney may be reluctant to raise
issues like the lack of availability of bail,1" 6 the conditions of
institutionalization, the possible iatrogenic or ameliorative impact
of psychiatric institutionalization on the defendant, and the length
of institutionalization
versus
the
potential
length
of
0 7
incarceration.' By addressing issues that relate to continuity of
care, similar situations as to what occurred with Billy can be
avoided, leading optimally to a reduction in unnecessary
institutionalization and incarceration, saving time and resources
and ensuring due process rights are upheld.
The questions we consider go far beyond those that could
be resolved in an individual case. A settlement order has recently
been entered in litigation brought by Disability Advocates, Inc.
against the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH") and
Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") seeking to
improve the conditions for persons with mental illness in prisons
in New York.10 8 In its complaint, Disability Advocates Inc. alleged

104. Id. § 730.40.
105. See Perlin, supra note 2, at 203-05.
106. Missing from the usual conversations about this topic is the reality that bailed
defendants have the right to exercise "voluntary" choice in deciding whether to take
drugs or, if they do decide to, what drugs to take. Such voluntariness is entirely missing in
the cases of economically disadvantaged defendants who cannot afford bail. See Perlin &
Schriver, supra note 59, at 402 (raising this issue).
107. Perlin, supra note 6, at 360. On how this decision must be a "nuanced" one, see
Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to
Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581, 1622 (2000); see also Keri A. Gould,
A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of Competency Evaluation Requests: The Defense Attorney's
Dilemma, 18 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83, 91-95 (1995) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel may ethically support the decision to ignore the competency
question entirely).
108. See Complaint at 2-3, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental
Health, No. 1:02-cv-04002-GEL (S.D.N.Y. filed May 28, 2002).
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that the defendants failed to provide adequate mental health
services, including necessary inpatient and residential mental
health programs, and imposed punishments that aggravated the
mental illness of prisoners in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and the
ADA." 9 Part of the settlement required improved mental health
treatment, additional beds for mental health hospital and
program beds, limits on punishment of prisoners with mental
illness, and the elimination of isolated confinement of prisoners
with serious mental illness." 0
Yet, despite the terms of this settlement, the treatment of
prisoners with serious mental illness in New York state prisons is
still problematic, as is the treatment of people in jail, a population
not covered in the lawsuit. 1 ' There is currently pending litigation,
Alcantara v. Annucci, brought by prisoners (sex offenders) who are
being housed in "residential treatment facilities" that are actually
converted correctional facilities in which prisoners are held
beyond their release dates." 2 Under New York corrections law,
residential treatment facilities are defined as community based
residences in or near a community where employment,
educational, and training opportunities are available." 3 Although
Alcantara involves sex offenders, the ruling could also affect how
persons with mental illness are treated in terms of release from
prisons. In addition, prisoners are often sent directly from prison
to be civilly committed in a psychiatric hospital after the
expiration of their sentence. 114 These case examples from New

109. Id. at 50-51.
110. Private Settlement Agreement at i, Disability Advocates, Inc., No. 1:02-cv-04002
-GEL (Apr. 27, 2007).
111. Jamie Fellner, Callous and Cruel: Use of Force Against Inmates with Mental Disabilities
in US Jails and Prisons, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 12, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2015/05/12/callous-and-cruel/use-force-ag-ainst-innates-mental-disabilities-us-jails-and;
Benjamin Weiser & Michael Schwirtz, Prison Guards Will Not Be Charged in an Inmate's
Death in 2015, ProsecutorsSay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2017, at Al5.
112. Verified Petition at 1-2, Alcantara v. Annucci, No. 2543-16, 55 Misc. 3d 1216(A)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017).
113. N.Y. CORREcT.1-AW§ 2(6) (McKinney 2014).
114. Cf Perlin, supra note 60, at 505 n.201 (discussing how, in State v. Krol, 344 A.2d
289, 297 (NJ. 1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted Baxstrom and Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), as "plainly attempt[ing] to enunciate a broad principlethat the fact that the person to be committed has previously engaged in criminal acts is
not a constitutionally acceptable basis for imposing upon him a substantially different
standard or procedure for involuntary commitment").
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York highlight some of the systemic problems that exist in the
treatment of persons with mental illness in prison. Continuity of
treatment is not possible when the conditions of mental health
treatment are substandard and carried out within a system where
the shuttling of persons with mental illness between jails and
prisons and hospitals is routine.
IV. RESEARCH

ON WHY CONTINUITY OF CARE IS CLINICALLY

NECESSARY

Research has shown that continuity of care leads to
improvement of clinical and functional outcomes for persons with
mental illness." 5 Persons with fewer gaps in mental health service
have better rehabilitative outcomes. 1 1 6 Further, continuity of care
health initiatives contribute to lower health care costs by reducing
the rate of psychiatric hospitalization. 7 In addition, receipt of
outpatient mental health services is associated with reduced risks
of arrests, at least in the near future."'
The transition from prison to community for a person with
mental illness can lead to negative outcomes, including
homelessness, higher suicide rate, and higher risk of overdose for
those prisoners with substance abuse problems." 9 A 2007 study
involving local prisons in London found that continuity of care for
prisoners with serious mental illnesses can be improved by
working with the individuals prior to release to identify their needs
and assisting them in engaging in necessary agencies in the
community.'
In addition, it is important for mental health
treatment to begin during incarceration because treatment gains
115. Carol E. Adair et al., Continuity of Care and Health Outcomes Among Persons with
Severe Mental Illness, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1061, 1068 (2005); John S. Brekke et al.,
Intensity and Continuity of Services and FunctionalOutcomes in the Rehabilitationof Persons with
Schizophrenia,50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 248, 255 (1999).
116. Adair et al., supra note 115, at 1068. For a discussion on the role of therapeutic
jurisprudence, see Priscilla Ferrazzi & Terry Krupa, Re: Mental Health Rehabilitation in
TherapeuticJurisprudence:TheoreticalImprovements, 46 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 42 (2016); see
also infra text accompanying notes 186-215 (discussing how the use of therapeutic
jurisprudence practices enhances the likelihood of authentic rehabilitation).
117. Craig R. Mitton et al., Continuity of Care and Health Care Costs Among Persons with
Severe Mental Illness, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1070, 1075 (2005).
118. Robert J. Constantine et al., The Impact of Mental Health Services on Arrests of
Offenders with Serious Mentalllness, 36 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 170,173 (2012).
119. Jarrett et al., supra note 36, at 187.
120. Id. at 192.
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coupled with concomitant services in the community are likely to
decrease recidivism, criminally or psychiatrically, for the
offender.' 21 It is also essential for offenders with mental illness to
receive services upon incarceration in order to eliminate any gaps
122
in service and improve outcomes.
V. LEGAL ARGUMENTS

There are legal issues that both support and complicate
continuity of care efforts. In this section, we first discuss the legal
right to continuity of care, and then we address some
complications that may arise regarding a person's individual rights
in the context of systemic problematic issues within the healthcare
system.
A. Right to Continuity of Care
Not only has valid and reliable behavioral research shown
why continuity of care is important, but it is also legally mandated.
It has long been established that prisoners have a right to mental
health treatment while incarcerated.1 2 3 Providing such services
ensures that correctional facilities remain safe for inmates and
staff and that persons with mental illness assimilate into the
124
correctional facility and back into society upon their release.
Courts have also recognized the importance of continuity of care
25
for prisoners reentering the community.1
Continuity of care is also required under the ADA.126 In
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court held that
unjustified isolation is discrimination based on disability and that
the ADA requires states to provide community-based treatment.1 27
Further, the Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA

121.

Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research Synthesis,

36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 46-47 (2012).

122.
123.
124.
125.
2008).
126.
127.

Id. at 47.
Burchett v. State Dep't of Corr., 564 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
Ogloff et al., supra note 96, at 124.
See United States v. Collado, No. 07 Cr. 1144(HB), 2008 WL 2329275 (S.D.N.Y.
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999).
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"unambiguously extends to state prison inmates." 2' 8 Thus it
logically follows that if the ADA applies both to community
integration and inmates, then persons with disabilities are
guaranteed the right to continuity of care. Absent reasonable
accommodations, prisoners with disabilities are less likely to
benefit from prison activities that can reduce recidivism and "are
more vulnerable to misunderstanding and exploitation by other
prisoners and correctional staff' increasing the likelihood of
29
present and future injury.'
Courts, however, are split on whether the ADA requires
police officers to accommodate an individual's disability upon
arrest.'
While the Supreme Court in City and County of San
Francisco v. Sheehan did not directly decide the question as to
whether the ADA applies to arrests, the Court did state that arrests
would be subject to Title II if the arrest is an activity in which the
arrestee participates or may benefit from and if that failure to
arrest the individual in a manner that reasonably accommodates
31
the disability constitutes discrimination.'
Although this question of whether the ADA applies to
arrests has not been decided by the Supreme Court on the merits,
there are advocacy and law enforcement agencies that have
already identified the importance of this issue and taken steps to
13 2
implement more accommodating policies and practices.
Comprehensive police officer training can enable officers to make
accurate individualized assessments about the level of threat posed
and the best way to modify police procedures to accommodate the
individual. 3 3 The most common method of safely accommodating
128.

Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998); see Perlin, supra note 2, at

221-22 (noting that Yeskey found that the ADA's language "unmistakably includes State
prisons and prisoners within its coverage," and that the law contained no "exception that

could cast the coverage of prisons into doubt" (quoting Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209)).
129. Blanck, supra note 91, at 314.
130. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2000) (Title II does not apply to
officer's on-the-street decisions). But see Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d. 1072, 1085

(11th Cir. 2007) (plain language of Title I supports inclusion of arrest); City & Cty. of
S.F. v. Sheehan, 743 F.3d. 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2014) (police officers are required to
accommodate a disability in arrest), rev'd in part, 135 S. CL 1765, 1773 (2015).
131. Sheehan, 135 S. CL at 1773.
132. Michael Pecorini, Note, Trying to Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Why Title 11 of
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Must Apply to All Law Enforcement Agencies, 24 BROOKLYN
J.L. & POL'Y 551, 594 (2016).
133. Shanna Rifkin, Note, Safeguardingthe ADA's AntidiscriminationMandate: Subjecting
Arrests to Title II Coverage, 66 DUKE L.J. 913, 935 (2017).
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persons with mental disabilities is through the use of a Crisis
Intervention Team which has been shown to reduce the incidence
of arrest by as much as nineteen percent."'
Finally, as we discuss subsequently, 35 there is also an
obligation under the CRPD to accommodate persons with
disabilities and the failure to do so constitutes discrimination.1 3 6
B. Legal Issues Potentially ComplicatingContinuity of
Care
Continuity of care should never override individual rights,
especially the right to medical privacy and the right to refuse
treatment. Treatment providers have to balance the ability to
share information to allow for more effective treatment with the
patient's right to privacy. Due to the ease of accessing electronic
medical records, a patient's history can "follow the person"
throughout hospitalizations,, and these records can include
various diagnoses, the number of times a patient has been
psychiatrically hospitalized, the psychotropic medication they have
taken, and any seclusion or restraint experiences. 37 Mistakes in
the medical record can mutate as information is often copied over
into multiple databases, making it nearly impossible for the
patient to correct. 13 8 The right to privacy is especially important
for persons with mental illness because of the stigma and shame
that surrounds mental illness. t39
134. Carly A. Myers, Police Violence Against People with Mental Disabilities: The Immutable
Duty Under the ADA to Reasonably Accommodate During Arrest, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1393, 1412
(2017).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 201-33.
136. Janet E. Lord, Shared Understanding or Consensus-Masked Disagreement? The AntiTorture Framework in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,33 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 27, 60 (2010).
137. What Is HIE?, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.hcalthitgov/providers-professionals/
health-information-exchange/what-hie (last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
138. See generally Arthur Allen, Electronic Record Errors Growing Issue in Lawsuits,
POLITICO (May 4, 2015, 6:40 AM), https://www.polifico.com/story/2015/05/clectronic-re
cord-errors-growing-issue-in-lawsuits-I 17591.
139. The stigma that accompanies mental illness has been characterized by one state
supreme court as "carr[ying] with it a stigma similar to that associated with a criminal
record," and likened by another court to the stigma that attaches to "dishonesty ...
serious felony... [or] manifest racism." Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good Is Bad, What's Bad
Is Good, You'll Find Out When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind"?, 35 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 235, 238 (2001-02) (quoting Nelson v. Ferguson, 399 S.E.2d 909, 913 (W. Va.
1990), and Green v. St Louis Hous. Auth., 911 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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HIPAA governs whether covered entities, such as hospitals
or medical facilities, can disclose protected health information
("PHI") to other parties." 4° In general, HIPAA prevents covered
entities from disclosing PHI except in certain prescribed
circumstances. 41 In New York, the highest court has held that
admitting medical records from other hospitalizations without
notice or consent of the patient in an assisted outpatient
treatment proceeding, is a violation of HIPAA. 142 While HIPAA
provides important protection of medical privacy, some family
members of persons with mental illness argue that HIPAA
prevents them from being able to adequately care for their loved
ones.

14 3

Health insurance coverage can determine which
psychotropic medications"44 are available both in in-patient and
out-patient settings.'4 5 The ACA greatly expanded and overhauled
health care coverage for persons in the US, and required that all
individuals either obtain minimum essential coverage through
employer-sponsored health programs, an individual health plan,
or government health plan, or face a financial penalty in form of a
tax. 146 It was designed to expand coverage of mental health and
47
substance use disorder benefits at parity with medical coverage.
Under the ACA, insurers are prohibited from discriminating
based on a preexisting condition.1 4 8 Marketplaces were also
created in order to assist people in comparing competing health

140. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2010); 42 U.S.C. §
1320d (2012).
141. Id.
142. In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. 2011).
143. Jorgio Castro, Piercing the Privacy Veil: Toward a Saner Balancing of Privacy and
Health in Cases of Severe Mental Illness, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1769, 1772 (2015).
144. Beyond the scope of this paper is an inquiry into whether these prescribed
medications actually do improve the individual's mental health in all cases. See, e.g.,James
B. Gottstein, Involuntary Commitment and Forced Psychiatric Drugging in the Trial Courts:
Rights Violations As a Matter of Course, 25 ALASKA L. Rev. 51, 51 (2008).
145. Supreme Court Upholds Affordable Care Act; Makes Medicaid Expansion Optional,DEV.
MENTAL HEALTH L.,July 2012, at 1, 8.
146. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (1989).
147. Samantha M. Behbahani et al., The PatientProtection and Affordable Care Act: Will
Parityfor Mental Health Care Truly Be Achieved in the 21st Century, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 153, 160 (2015).
148. 45 C.F.R. § 147.108 (2015).
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programs. 4 9 The ACA also expanded Medicaid eligibility for
1 50
individuals.
Although the ACA does not directly address medical care
for prisoners, there are ways that the ACA can benefit inmates and
formerly incarcerated individuals. 151 "ACA reforms pave the way
for new and stronger partnerships among those institutions
involved in correctional health and community health.' ' 5 2 The
ACA also allows for the enrollment of individuals who are
incarcerated pending the disposition of charges.'5 3 Further, the
expansion of individual insurance coverage should lead to
broader benefits including the reduction of infectious diseases
and lower rates of drug use and re-arrest.'5 4
The Psychiatric Services and Clinical Knowledge
Enhancement System ("PSYCKES") is an online database in New
York that contains information on persons who receive Medicaid.
It is designed to identify individuals who could benefit from
clinical review and provide help to treatment providers to develop
treatment plans. 55 PSYCKES uses information from Medicaid
claims data such as history of illnesses or injuries, outpatient
services, medications, hospital services, labs performed, 156 and
information that comes from consumers who are subject to court57
ordered assisted outpatient treatment plans.'
Although this all appears to be salutary and geared toward
greater continuity of care, PSYCKES nonetheless raises multiple
important ethical issues that cannot be ignored. For example,
PSYCKES begs the question of whether or not it fair for only
individuals on Medicaid to be subject to such a database whereas
anyone with private health insurance would not be part of the
database and whether this information be used as evidence in
cases in which patients challenge their hospital retention or assert
149.
150.

45 C.F.R. § 146 (2011).
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (10) (1973).

151.

Joel B. Teitelbaum & Laura G. Hoffman, Health Reform and Correctional Health

Care: How the Affordable Care Act Can Improve the Health of Ex-Offenders and Their
Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323, 1348 (2013).
152. Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(B) (2010).
154. Teitelbaum & Hoffman. supra note 151, at 1356.
155. About PSYCKES, N.Y. ST. OFF. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhw
eb/psyckes-medicaid/about (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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their right to refuse medication?15 8 PSYCKES thus highlights the
need to balance medical privacy rights with the need to facilitate
continuity of care through the electronic sharing of medical
information. A careful balance must be achieved, protecting
individual rights for all individuals, no matter whether the
individual in question receives Medicaid or has private insurance.
59
C. Advance PsychiatricDirectives'

Advance psychiatric directives can be used in order to
address continuity of care issues. A psychiatric advance directive is
a legally enforceable document that specifies the manner in which
treatment decisions are to be made in the event the person later
becomes incompetent.1' 6 It can specify both who should make
treatment decisions and also what specific treatment should be
administered, including psychiatric medication, in the event of
incapacity. 161 In theory, it should "follow" the person no matter
where they are hospitalized or incarcerated. 62 In order to execute
a psychiatric advance directive, an individual must have the ability
to: understand and appreciate the risks and benefits of treatment;
engage in rational deliberation; and understand the meaning and
63
significance of the delegation.
The use of these psychiatric advance directives may have
significant therapeutic value. 164 Such directives can empower
persons with mental illness to have control over their treatment
and may encourage their clinicians to treat them with dignity and
respect, rather than paternalistically. 165 They can foster a more

158. Information from PSYCKES is regularly contained in patient's medical records
that are admitted into evidence when a patient is subject to a civil proceeding like a
retention hearing or treatment over objection hearing. PSYCKES is also unavailable to
patient's attorneys. Office of Mental Health, PSYCKES- Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. ST.
OFF.

MENTAL

HEALTH,

https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/psyckesmedicaid/faq/#Al

(last updated Aug. 2013).
159. Infra text accompanying notes 165-83 is generally adapted from Perlin &
Weinstein, supra note 17.
160. Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and
PracticalOverview for Legal Professionals,4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 746 (1998).
161. Id. at 749.
162. See id. at 777.
163. Id.
164. Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 57, 81 (1996).
165. Id. at 81, 83.
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collaborative model of care for psychiatric treatment and
encourage voluntary treatment. 166 They may also avoid the need
for a judicial finding of incapacity6 7 and could avoid the need for
a guardian. 68
Nevertheless, psychiatric advance directives raise serious
ethical issues when the issue of potential revocation is raised. 6 9
The most important issue to be considered is whether psychiatric
advance directives should override the constitutional right to
refuse medication. 17 This issue applies not just to persons facing
institutionalization but also persons with mental illness who are in
the criminal justice system.' 71 Some psychiatric advance directives
purport to be irrevocable which can cause particular problems for
172
patients who have chosen to be treated with specific medication.
Even if refusing psychiatric treatment may limit the person's
ability to act autonomously and even to lose competency, the
person may authoritatively choose that course of action while still
competent.

1 73

Psychiatric advance directives also create issues when a
treating clinician who is unfamiliar with the patient and is
reluctant to administer the patient's specific treatment, 74 or does
not think following the patient's advance directives would be in
the patient's best interests. 75 Failure to follow a patient's advance
directive may violate the ADA's antidiscrimination clause.'7 6 It can
166. Gallagher, supra note 160, at 783.
167. Winick, supra note 164, at 84.
168. Judy A. Clausen, Making the Case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive
Statute, 14YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 19 (2014).
169. Winick, supra note 164, at 86. On the question of increased costs connected to
the use of such directives, see Nancy Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV.
845 (1990).
170. See generally Gallagher, supra note 160, at 762-67.
171. See Robert D. Miller, Advance Directivesfor Psychiatric Treatment: A View from the
Trenches, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 728, 742-43 (1998).
172. Gallagher, supra note 160, at 779.
173. Mark J. Cherry, Non-Consensual Treatment Is (Nearly Always) Morally Impermissible,
38J.L. MED. & ETHICS 789, 792 (2010).
174. Winick, supra note 164, at 71; see also BruceJ. Winick, Client Denial and Resistance
in the Advance Directive Context: Rejlections on How Attorneys Can Identify and Deal with a
Psycholegal Soft Spot, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 901, 903 (1998) ("A court may, in the
event of their incompetency, choose someone else to play this role, perhaps someone
unfamiliar with the person's values and preferences.").
175. Judy A. Clausen, An Americans with Disabilities Act Critique of Advance Directive
Override Provisions,71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 25, 50 (2015).
176. Id. at 51.
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also create issues if certain prescriptions are not covered by
insurance.' 77 Furthermore, patients may be subject to coercion
with regard to their decision-making as to whether or not to
178
accept a psychiatric advance directive.
In an ideal world, psychiatric advance directives could
provide a meaningful way for clients to direct their care according
to their own wishes, leading to more congruity between their
quality of life in the community and that quality posthospitalization.' 79 Advance directives can be a tool used to help
patients advocate for consistent treatment that is both voluntary
and based on decisions made when the person had the capacity to
make such decisions. By having clear directives in writing, persons
with mental illness can dictate exactly what treatment they would
agree to, including specific medications they are willing or
unwilling to take, no matter where they are being treated and even
if they are dealing with different treatment providers. This can
thus avoid many of the issues that arise when persons with mental
illness shuttle between hospitals, jails, and the community, and, as
a result, lack consistent treatment.

VI. THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE

180

One of the most important legal theoretical developments
of the past three decades has been the creation and dynamic
growth of therapeutic jurisprudence.' Therapeutic jurisprudence

177. INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS: MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCED DIRECTIVES FOR
PENNSYLVANIANS 7 (2005), http://dhs.pa.gov/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/manua
I/s_002548.pdf.
178.

Winick, supra note 164, at 88.

179. Gallagher, supra note 160, at 782.
180. Infra text accompanying notes 186-94 is generally adapted from Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients".Persons with Mental Disabilities and the
Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 277 (2014); Perlin & Lynch supra note 12, at
433; Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 17, at 111. See generally Michael L. Perlin, What Is
TherapeuticJurisprudence?,10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993).
181. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996);
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005).

Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental
Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law:
TherapeuticJurisprudence,16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992); David B. Wexler,
TherapeuticJurisprudenceForum: The Development of TherapeuticJurisprudence:From Theory to
Practice,68 REV.JURiDICA U. P.R. 691, 693-94 (1999).
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presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and
legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can
82
have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.
Therapeutic jurisprudence asks whether legal rules,
procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to
enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due
process principles. 8 ' David Wexler clearly identifies how the
tension inherent in this inquiry must be resolved: "the law's use of
mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
[cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."18' 4 Such an inquiry into
therapeutic outcomes does not mean that "therapeutic concerns
'trump' civil rights and civil liberties." 185
Using therapeutic jurisprudence, we "look at law as it
actually impacts people's lives"' 86 by assessing the law's influence
on emotional life and psychological well-being. 187 One governing
principle of therapeutic jurisprudence is that "law should value
psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing antitherapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent
with other values served by law should attempt to bring about

182. See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will
JurorsRespond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885,
912 (2009); see also Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91, 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry
Peterson eds., 2006) (showing a transnational perspective).
183. Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering
the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons InstitutionalizedBecause of Mental Disability in Forensic
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend,
My Doctor, Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got" The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to
Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005); see also fan Freckelton,
TherapeuticJurisprudenceMisunderstoodand Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30
T.JEFFERSON L. REv. 575, 585-86 (2008).
184. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also David Wexler, Applying the Law
Therapeutically,5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 185 (1996).

185. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing,68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael
L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory and
Practice, "Us" and "Them, "31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
186. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
187. David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:Psycholegal Soft Spots and
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45,
45 (Daniel P. Stolle et al. eds., 2006).
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healing and wellness."1 '88 In
other words,
therapeutic
89
jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.'
The question to be posed here is this: does our current
system comply with these precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence?
Remarkably, this is an inquiry that has been considered only once
before in legal scholarship. 9 ° In that instance, Rebecca Spain
Broches concluded-with total accuracy-that "criminal justice
system procedures that disrupt the course of treatment are
contrary to the vision, developed by therapeutic jurisprudence and
adopted by this paper, that law should further therapeutic
ends.""' Broches points out that disruption in continuity of care
makes relapse or decompensation more likely,'92 and that criminal
justice system procedures that disrupt the course of treatment are
"contrary
to
the
vision,
developed
by
therapeutic
jurisprudence.., that law should further therapeutic ends."' 9 3
We agree entirely with Broches, and suggest that her
findings be the first building block in the creation of new policies
that break the cycle of continuity-disruption. Using the words of
an important report by the Rutgers Center for Behavioral Health
Services and Criminal Justice Research, we also acknowledge that
each individual in question "having [both] a serious mental illness
and entanglements with the justice system, is more than an illness
or an offender."1 '94 If we acknowledge, again, as Broches points
out, that "symptoms of mental illness [are] the manifestations of a
health problem, rather than... byproducts of criminality,"' 195 we
can begin to apply therapeutic jurisprudence insights to this

188.

Bruce Winick, A

Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in

INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION
AND
THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE:
INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).

189. See, e.g., BruceJ. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of TherapeuticJurisprudencein
Law School ClinicalEducation: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605,
605-06 (2006).
190. Broches, supra note 9.
191. Id. at 100.
192. Id.
193.

Id.

194. MATTHEW EPPERSON ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVS. &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, THE NEXT GENERATION OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS: IMPROVING OUTCOMES BY IMPROVING INTERVENTIONS
29 (Sept. 2011), https://csgjusticecenter.org/documents/0000/1173/9.21.11_Thenext_
generationMonographSept__2011.pdf
195.

Broches, supra note 9, at 100.
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problem in ways that might, in fact, begin to ameliorate the woeful
situation that we face.
To do this effectively, we must demand that the discharge
procedures in place actually serve the individual so as to provide a
foundation for successful reentry. 9 6 These procedures must be
ones that will help determine whether any "mental health gains
made during incarceration will translate into the outside world"' 97
Although there has been some notable litigation that has resulted
in jail officials being ordered to arrange discharge planning
services for inmates with mental illness being released into the
community,19 8 there has been a paucity of such litigation in the
cases of prison release.' 9 9
These points are not novel and have previously been
considered. Over twenty years ago, Professor James Ogloff and his
colleagues advocated that community mental health centers
provide assessments and treatment services while an inmate is in
prison and services following release if the inmate remains in the
local community.200 Subsequent studies demonstrated that
continuity was also significantly associated with a better quality of
life, better community functioning, lower severity of symptoms,
and greater service satisfaction. 201 Yet, still today, the evidence is
clear that prisons have continuously failed to provide adequate
mental health care services for inmates with mental illness, 2 2 a
failure that mocks the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.
196. Id.
197. Id.at 11.
198. See, e.g., Heather Barr, Transinstitutionalizationin the Courts: Brad H. v. City of
New York, and the Fight for Discharge Planningfor People with Psychiatric DisabilitiesLeaving
Rikers Island, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 97 (2003).
199. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring the
state "to provide outgoing prisoners being treated for a medical condition with a
sufficient support of medication to cover their transition to the outside world"); Lugo v.
Senkowski, 114 F. Supp. 2d 111 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Fox v. Peters, No. 16-cv-01602, 2016 WL
4265736 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2016) (following Wakefield's reasoning); see also Simone S. Hicks,
Behind Prison Walls: The Failing Treatment Choicefor Mentally Ill Minority Youth, 39 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 979, 1007 (2011); Dlugacz & Droubi, supra note 30, at 141 (referring to the
"limited" number of prison cases adopting the Wakefield approach). But see Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 511(2011) (noting that if a court determines that overcrowding in ajuvenile
detention center is the primary reason for the inadequate provision of mental health
services, the court should issue a prison release order).
200. Ogloffet al., supra note 96, at 129.
201. Adair et al., supra note 115, at 1061.
202. Desirae Hutchison, Inadequate Mental Health Services for Mentally Ill Inmates, 38
WHITrIERL. REv. 161, 179 (2017).
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Empirically, there is no question that evidence shows that
therapeutic jurisprudence "works" in reducing post-release
recidivism by promoting "active and productive community
participation by ex-offenders." 20 3 For example, in a work release
project in Delaware sponsored by the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, prisoners who participated in prison-based treatment and
post-release care "were seven times more likely to be drug-free and
three times more likely to be arrest-free after three years than
those who received no treatment. 2 0 4 Another study concluded
that reentry programs "had a larger effect on recidivism when they
lasted long enough (thirteen weeks or more) and provided
continuity of care (had multiple phases, beginning in the
institution and extending into the community upon release)."205
Such post-release care, again, comports with therapeutic
jurisprudence principles.20 6
As previously discussed, the clear evidence of the value of
continuity of care-how it improves post-release engagement with
mental health services,20 7 how transition planning facilitates such
continuity of care, 208 and how a correctional system that adopts
such transitional services can have a "direct effect" on post-release
physical

and

mental

health 2 0 9-is

totally

consonant

with

therapeutic jurisprudence values.

203. Christy A. Visher, Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons About
PrisonerReentry, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 93, 99 (2007).
204. Beth A. Colgan, Teaching a Prisoner to Fish: Getting Tough on Crime by Preparing
Prisonersto Reenter Society, 5 SEA'TTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 293, 305 n.103 (2006) (discussing
findings reported on in Nora D. Volkow, Treat the Addict, Cut the Crime Rate, WASH. POST,
Aug. 19, 2006, at A17); see also Robert J. Constantine et al., The Impact of Mental Health
Seruices on Arrests of Offenders with a Serious Mental Illness, 36 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 170, 173
(2012) ("[R] eceipt of outpatient services is associated with reduced risks of arrests in the
relatively immediate future.").
205. Cheryl Lero Jonson & Francis T. Cullen, PrisonerReentry Programs, 44 CRIME &
JUST. 517, 551 (2015).
206. On how such programs also offer opportunities to counteract racism, see
Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: PrisonerReentry As an Opportunity to Confront
and CounteractRacism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LJ. 259 (2009). On the relationship
between race and arrest policies (policies that lead to the underlying problems), see, for
example, BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 46 (2006);
Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: UnderstandingDisparitiesin DrugDelivery
Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105 (2006); Scott Holmes, Resisting Arrest and Racism - The Crime
of"Disrespect,"85 UMKC L. REV. 625 (2016).
207. McKenna et al., supra note 37 (citing Binswanger et al., supra note 38).
208. Baillargeon et al., supra note 39.
209. Freudenberg, supra note 24, at 214.

WAKE FORESTJOURNAL OFLAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:2

486
VII.

MENTAL HEALTH COURTS

Consider the potential role of "mental health courts"
("MHCs") as a partial remedy for the problems that we have been
discussing. 210 Indisputably, one of the most important
developments in the past two decades in the treatment of criminal
defendants with mental illness within the criminal justice system is
the creation and the expansion of mental health courts. Mental
health courts are a kind of "problem-solving court, '"211 and their
importance grows as society come to grips with how badly it has
failed to provide the sort of continuity of care that should be
required legally, ethically and morally.2 12 There is a wide range of
dispositional alternatives available to judges in these cases, 21 3 and
214
an even wider range ofjudicial attitudes.
These courts offer a radically new approach to the
problems at hand. 215 They offer an approach that incorporates an
210. See generally Michael L. Perlin, 'There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden". Mental
Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,Dignity and the Promise of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette
McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013); Michael L. Perlin, "The Judge, He Cast His Robe
Aside ": Mental Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 1
(2013); Perlin & Lynch, supra note 92; Michael L. Perlin, "Who Will Judge the Many When
the Game Is Through?": Considering the Profound Differences Between Mental Health Courts and
"Traditional"Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (2018) [hereinafter
Perlin, Who WillJudge] (forthcoming).
211. See, e.g., Greg Berman &John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23
LAW & POLY 125, 127 (2001); Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, The Future of Problem-Solving
Justice: An InternationalPerspective, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 1, 3
(2010); see also Ursula Castellano, The Politics of Benchcraft: The Role of Judges in Mental
Health Courts, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 398, 398 (2017).
212. See supra Parts III-VI.
213. See, e.g., HenryJ. Steadman et al., From Referral to Disposition: Case Processingin
Seven Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SC. & L. 215, 220 (2005).
214. See, e.g., Michael S. King, Should Problem-Solving Courts Be Solution-Focused Courts?,
80 REV.JURiDICA U. P.R. 1005, 1021 (2011). On whyjudges in mental health courts should
model their courts after the work done in Florida by Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren and in
New York by Judge Matthew D'Emic, see also Perlin, Who WillJudge, supra note 210, at 2122, 32. We concede that the entire concept of "mental health courts" is certainly not
without controversy. See, e.g., Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health Courts: A Misguided Attempt to
Address the CriminalJustice System's Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illness, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 570, 576 (2005). We take the position, though, that it is the efforts to
squelch the growing mental health court movement that are misguided. See Perlin, Who
WillJudge, supra note 210, at 13-15.
215. Some jurisdictions are beginning to seek out other alternative and
complementary solutions to these issues. For recently passed New York City local laws
addressing the issue of mental health in the criminal system, see, for example, Arrestee
Health Screenings and the Exchange of Health Information of Inmates in the Custody of the
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articulated focus on dignity,216 that optimally embrace of
therapeutic jurisprudence, and that focus on procedural justice,
and uses of the principles of restorative justice.2 17 We believe that
we need to begin to take seriously the potential ameliorative
impact of such courts on the ways that continuity of care can
meaningfully be provided to criminal defendants with mental
disabilities.

218

It needs to be stressed that such courts are set up
differently in different jurisdictions. Although there is not one

Department of Correction, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL (Oct. 18, 2016), http://egistar.council.nyc.gov
/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2735148&GUID=44E35DA3-1843-4456-95B6-51 I DOFF7EFB7;
Requiring the Use of Trauma-Informed Care in City CorrectionalFacilities, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL
(Oct. 18, 2016), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2683868&GUI
D=50FF659A-5Dll-42BC-A364-C15155C237CC&Options=&Search=.
On the need for
trauma-informed lawyering in dealing with the population in question, see Sarah Katz &
Deeya Haldar, The Pedagogy of Trauma Informed Lawyering, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 359, 359
(2016); see also Mehgan Gallagher & Michael L. Perlin, "The Pain I Rise Above" How
InternationalHuman Rights Can Best Realize the Needs of Persons with Trauma-Related Mental
Disabilities,29 FLA.J. INT'L L. 217 (2018).
216. See Ginger Lerner-Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving Justice and Promoting
Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 593 (2010) (explaining dignity in the context of
mental health courts).
217. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 88-96 (2013); Jessica Burns, A RestorativeJustice
Model for Mental Health Courts, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 427 (2014); Thomas L.
Hafemeister et al., ForgingLinks and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principlesof Restorative and
ProceduralJustice to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L.
REV. 147, 201-02 (2012); HenryJ. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise and
Unanswered Questions, 52 LAW & PSYCHIATRY 457, 457-58 (2001) (discussing therapeutic
jurisprudence in this context). On the relationship between these three approaches, see
PERLIN, supra, at 96-98; Michael L. Perlin, Considering the "AlternativeJurisprudences"As a
Tool of Social Change to Reduce Humiliation and Uphold Dignity," (Dec. 6, 2012) (paper
presented to the 20th annual conference of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies
Network). For a comparative law consideration of the role of procedural justice in
democratic policing in Taiwan, see Yuning Wu et al., ProceduralJustice Received and Given:
Supervisory Treatment, Emotional States, and Behavioral Compliance Among Taiwanese Police
Officers, 44 CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 963 (2017).
218. On the utility of mental health courts in other jurisdictions, see, for example,
Katey Thorn, New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal Characteristicsand Outcomes 19932011, 22 AUSTL. PSYCHIATRY 341 (2014) (N.Z.); Penelope Weller, Taking a Reflexive Turn:
Non-AdversarialJusticeand Mental Health Review Tribunals, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 81 (2011)
(Austi.). On why the proposed Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific should,
in part, operate under these principles, see Michael L. Perlin & Mehgan Gallagher, Why a
Disability Rights Tribunal Must Be Premised on TherapeuticJurisprudencePrinciples, 10 PSYCH.
INJ. & L. 244 (2017). On why mental health courts should be premised on therapeutic
jurisprudence and procedural justice, see Kimberly A. Kaiser & Kristy Holtfreter, An
Integrated Theory of Specialized Court Programs Using Procedural Justice and Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceto Promote Offender Compliance and Rehabilitation,43 CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 45
(2016).
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single prototype of MHCs, 2 19 virtually all include the creation of a
special docket that is handled by a particular judge, with the
primary goal of diverting defendants from the criminal justice
system and into treatment. 220 As part of the commitment of these
courts to team approaches, 221 representatives from justice and
treatment agencies assist the judge in screening offenders to
determine whether they would present a risk of violence if
released to the community, in devising appropriate treatment
plans, and in supervising and monitoring the individual's
222
performance in treatment.
The MHC judge functions as part of a mental health team
that decides whether the individual has treatment needs and can

219. Such courts are set up very differently in different jurisdictions. There are now,
according to the Council of State Governments' Justice Center, over 375 such courts in
operation in the United States, some dealing solely with misdemeanors, some solely with
non-violent offenders, and some with no such restrictions. See, e.g., Ursula Castellano,
Courting Compliance: Case Managers As "DoubleAgents" in the Mental Health Court, 36 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 484, 490 (2011); Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First
Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J.
1479, 1495 (2006); Donald M. Linhorst & P. Ann Dirks-Linhorst, Mental Health Courts:
Development, Outcomes, and Future Challenges, 54JUDGES'J. 22, 22 (2015) (citing E. Leah
Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 519, 521 (2012); and How
Many Problem-Solving Courts Are There?, NATL DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR. (2012),
http://www.ndc rc.org/content/how-many-problem-solving-courts-are-there). See generally
Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 210. On the expansion of these courts to include felony
prosecutions, see Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental
Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 587 (2005).

220. Roger Boothroyd et al., The Broward Mental Health Court: Process, Outcomes, and
Service Utilization, 26 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 55, 55 (2003). At least one evaluation of such
courts has concluded: "Most ... defendants have been nuisance offenders who have a
high incidence of drug co-morbidity, treatment plan noncompliance, and recidivism.
Their high recidivism rate and the problem of severe jail overcrowding made the mental
health court experiment especially attractive to some county policy makers." Gerald Nora,
Prosecutor As "Nurse Ratched"? Misusing CriminalJustice As Alternative Medicine, 22 CRIM.
JUST. 18, 22 (2007).
221. See, e.g., ArthurJ. Lurigio &Jessica Snowden, Putting TherapeuticJurisprudenceinto
Practice: The Growth, Operations, and Effectiveness of Mental Health Court, 30 JUST. SYS.]. 196,
210 (2009); Marlee E. Moore & Virginia A. Hiday, Mental Health Court Outcomes: A
Comparison of Re-Arrest and Re-Arrest Severity Between Mental Health Court and Traditional
Court Participants, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 659, 660 (2006). On variances in team
approaches, see Sheryl Kubiak et al., Assessing the Role of Legal Actors Across Eight Mental
Health Courts, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 301, 304 (2013).
222. Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9
PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 107, 125-26 (2003). On the role ofjail as a potential sanction in
the cases of non-compliant defendants, see Allison Redlich et al., Patterns of Practice in
Mental Health Courts:A NationalSurvey, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 355-56 (2006).
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be safely released into the community. 223 First, the team
formulates a treatment plan; then, a court-employed case manager
and court monitor track the individual's participation in the
treatment program and submit periodic reports to the judge
concerning his or her progress. 224 Participants are required to
report to the court periodically so that the judge can monitor
treatment compliance. 225 Moreover, additional status review
hearings are held on an as-needed basis. 2 26 These courts provide
"nuanced" approaches, 227 and may signal a "fundamental shift" in
228
the criminal justice system.
By increasing the likelihood of a person with mental
disability being diverted out of the criminal justice system, such
courts both make it less likely that the person with mental
disabilities will suffer at the hands of others because of their
status,229 and make it more likely that continuity of care can be
achieved in their cases. The non-coercive nature and dignitarian
values of MHCs result in a more favorable response to offered care
from defendants. 2 ° When these courts "buy into" the precepts of
223. On the often-conflicting roles of case managers in mental health courts, see
Castellano, supra note 219, at 490-91. On the how caseworkers, in other contexts,
"transform traditional courtroom justice," see URSULA CASTELLANO, OUTSOURCING
JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF. NONPROFIT CASEWORKERS

IN PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS

9

(2011).
224. LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO
RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2009).
225. Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 507, 520-21 (2005). For a recent article articulating strategies to optimize
criminal justice-treatment collaborations, see J. Steven Lamberti, Preventing Criminal
Recidivism Through Mental Health and CriminalJustice Collaboration,67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS.
1206 (2016). On how the adoption of a consumer-participation model in mental health
courts can improve mental health court participants' capacity for voluntary participation,
see McDaniel M. Kelly, Rehabilitation Through Empowerment: Adopting the ConsumerParticipationModel for Treatment Planningin Mental Health Courts, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
581, 584 (2015).
226. Id.
227. Patricia C. McManus, A Therapeutic JurisprudentialApproach to Guardianship of
Persons with Mild Cognitive Impairment, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 591, 598 (2006).
228. Developments in the Law-The Law of Mental Illness: Mental Health Courts and the
Trend Toward a RehabilitativeJusticeSystem, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1168, 1176 (2008).
229. Terry Carney et al., Mental Health Tribunals: 'TJ" Implications of Weighing Fairness,
Freedom, Protection and Treatment, 17 JUD. ADMIN. 46, 54 (2007); Risdon Slate, From the
Jailhouse to Capitol Hill: Impacting Mental Health Court Legislation and Defining What
Constitutes a Mental Health Court, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 6 (2003).
230. See, e.g., Joseph A. DaGrossa, Improving Legitimacy in Community-Based Corrections,
78 FED. PROB. 22 (June 2014) (citing C. Pratt et al., Predictors of CriminalJustice Outcomes
among Mental Health Courts Participants:The Role of Perceived Coercion and Subjective Mental
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therapeutic jurisprudence, their likelihood of success is
enhanced. 231 "Even a well-resourced problem-solving court may
not work if the judge fails to adopt therapeutic jurisprudence and
other problem-solving strategies effectively."' 232 Furthermore, if
MHC judges "selectively apply, blend and transform" elements
from the treatment and legal spheres to adjudicate cases
therapeutically so as to "generate more effective solutions, ' 233 it is
more likely that authentically meaningful continuity of care can be
maintained.2 3 4

Health Recovery, 12 INT'LJ. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 116 (2013) ("In a 2013 study based
on a sample of criminal defendants admitted into a mental health court and diversion
program in New York, Pratt et al. observed a negative correlation between perceptions of
coercion into treatment and perceptions of recovery.")).
231. See, e.g., Patrick Geary, Juvenile Mental Health Courts and TherapeuticJurisprudence:
Facing the ChallengesPosed by Youth with Mental Disabilitiesin the JuvenileJustice System, 5 YALE
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 671 (2005). This "buy in" is not universal. We do have some
concerns about the operationalization of the courts in some jurisdictions. See E. Lea
Johnston & Conor Flynn, Mental Health Courts and Sentencing Disparities,62 VILL. L. REV.
685, 693 (2017) (empirically studying MHCs in Erie County, PA, and concluding that
anticipated treatment court sentences-for all grades of offense-typically exceed county
court sentences by more than a year).
232. Vicki Lens, Against the Grain: TherapeuticJudging in a TraditionalFamily Court, 41
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 701, 704 (2016). Beyond the scope of this paper is an evaluation of
the potential role of independent expert witnesses. On the use of such experts in
traditional civil commitment cases, see Dlugacz & Roskes, supra note 43. Although one
analysis of mental health courts touts, as a court advantage, the "elimination of dueling
experts," see Andrew Wasicek, Mental Illness and Crime: Envisioning a Public Health Strategy
and Reimagining Mental Health Courts, 48 NO. 1 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 6 (2012), and one
judge has noted that, in his court, at least, "Not infrequently there can be a request for a
second opinion,"John Shepard Wiley,Jr., Taming Patent:Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent
Cases, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1413, 1426 (2003), there is virtually no research literature
whatsoever on the use of independent experts in these courts. Professors Baker and Zawid
note that "expert testimony is common in mental health courts." Gregory Baker &
Jennifer Zawid, The Birth of a TherapeuticCourts Externship Program:Hard Laborbut Worth the
Effort, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 711, 739 (2005). However, from the context of the BakerZawid article, they appear to be referring to testimony by team members, not
independent expert witnesses.
233. Castellano, supra note 211, at 405. Professor Castellano-in her study of four
separate mental health courts-found that the judges she observed were "deeply involved
in investigating problems, collecting personal client information, and actively consulting
with treatment professionals and law enforcement offices." Id.
234. It should be noted that mental health courts actually work as they are intended
to. Participants had significantly lower arrest rates after enrollment than before
enrollment and lower post-enrollment arrest rates than comparison groups, and in fact,
were more successful at reducing recidivism-recidivism rates of twenty-five percent versus
ten to fifteen percent-than were drug courts. Greg Goodale et al., What Can We Say About
Mental Health Courts Today?, 64 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 298 (2013). On the role of perceived
coercion in the mental health court process, see Sarah Kopelovich et al., ProceduralJustice
in Mental Health Courts: Judicial Practices, ParticipantPerceptions, and Outcomes Related to
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Finally, and most importantly, research also suggests that
mental health court participation increases access to and
utilization of mental health care, 2 5 reduces the use of crisis or
high-intensity services, and reduces substance use. 23 6 The most
recent relevant study-authored by a sitting trial judge-has
concluded that "problem-solving treatment courts are the best way
to supervise criminal defendants in the community who present
both high needs and a high risk to re-offend absent
intervention." 237 In short, they are the best way to ensure that
continuity of care is actually provided.238
VIII. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

A. Introduction
It is essential for those who are concerned with the
questions that we raise in this paper to take a hard look at
international human rights law, 23 9 especially the United Nations'
Mental Health Recovery, 36 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 113 (2013) (procedural justice positively
correlated with participants' attitudes toward their own recovery); Evan Lowder et al.,
Recidivism Following Mental Health Court Exit: Between and Within-Group Comparisons,40 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 118 (2016) (noting mental health courts are particularly effective for
high-risk participants, and time spent in such courts have positive effects on recidivism);
Allison Redlich & Woojae Han, Examining the Links Between Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand
Mental Health Court Completion, 38 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 109 (2014) (explaining increased
levels of procedural justice and perceived voluntariness led to decreased rates of new
arrests in mental health court populations).
235. See, e.g., Boothroyd et al., supra note 220; Christine M. Sarteschi, Mentally Ill
Offenders Involved with the US CriminalJustice System, 3 SAGE OPEN, no. 3 (2013). See generally
Woojae Han & Allison Redlich, The Impact of Community Treatment on Recidivism Among
Mental Health Court Participants,67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 384 (2016) (showing increases in
receipt of community treatment among MHC participants, and decreased recidivism).

236. Kellie Canada et al., The Emergence of Mental Health Courts in the United States:
Intersecting Innovation Between Psychiatric Care and the Law, 5 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'YJ.
31, 57 (2016) (citing Erin Comartin et al., Short and Long-Term Outcomes of Mental Health
Court Participantsby Psychiatric Diagnosis, 66 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 923, 926 (2015); Kelly
Fraling, How Mental Health Courts Function: Outcomes and Observations, 33 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 207, 212 (2010)).
237. Kerry Meyer, Hennepin County Criminal Mental Health Court: Experiences in a Large
Metropolitan Mental Health Court, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REv. 485, 521 (2016). On how
MHCs in some states can vary radically from county to county, see Monte Staton & Arthur
Lurigio, Mental Health Courts in Illinois: Comparing and ContrastingProgram Models, Sanction
Applications, Information Sharing and ProfessionalRoles, 79 FED. PROB. 21 (2015).
238. But see Johnston & Flynn, supra note 231 (critically reviewing the operation of
such courts in Erie, PA).
239. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (2011).
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40
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD").2
Although this may appear counter-intuitive-given the United
States' record of failing to ratify the most important human rights
treaties of the past decade 241-we argue that, given the fact that
President Obama signed the CRPD,24 2 the United States is now
obligated by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which
requires signatories "to refrain from acts which would defeat
[CRPD's] object and purpose. "243
In this section, we initially consider the CRPD and how it
has created a new framework of disability, looking briefly at the
key articles for the purpose of this paper. We then argue that
continuity of care, as we described it here, is required by
international human rights law.

B. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities("CRPD "): Moving Toward a New
Framework of Disability44
The CRPD "is regarded as having finally empowered the
'world's largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate

240. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,UNITED NATIONS
(Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convention-acce
ssible-pdf.
241. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and InternationalLaw, 52 DuKE
L.J. 485 (2002); Amy Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States'International
Human Rights Double Standard-Explanation,Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L.
REv. 59 (2001).
242. Former President Obama signed the CRPD five years ago. See Michelle Diament,
Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty, DISABILITY SCOOP (May 18, 2012), http://
www.disabilityscoop.Com/2012/05/18/Obama-Urges-Senate-Treaty/15654. However, the
Senate failed to ratify on December 4, 2012, because of a lack of a "super majority" of
votes. U.N. Treaty on Disabilities Falls Short in Senate, CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-treaty-on-disabilities-falls-short-in-senate.
243. Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with
Limited Competency in GuardianshipProceedings, 4 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331,
362-63 (2011).
244. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, "Strikingfor the Guardians
and Protectors of the Mind": The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Future of GuardianshipLaw, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1159, 1173-76 (2013).
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in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others
who have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection. "245
This Convention is the most revolutionary international human
rights document ever created that applies to persons with
disabilities. 2 ' The Convention furthers the human rights
approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with
disabilities to equality in almost every aspect of life.247 It firmly
endorses a social model of disability, a clear and direct
repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-andparcel of mental disability law. 24 s "The Convention responds to
traditional models, situates disability within a social model
framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply
to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of
persons with disabilities." 24 9 It provides a framework for ensuring
that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with
mental illness." 250 There is no question that it has "ushered in a
251
new era of disability rights policy.
The CRPD calls for "respect for inherent dignity" 252 and
"non-discrimination." 253 Subsequent articles declare "freedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, "254 "freedom from exploitation, violence and

245. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.17 (2008). See
generally Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity,
Guardianship,and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 134-37(2012).
246. See generally COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND POLICY (Bernadette McSherry &
Ian Freckelton eds., 2013).
247. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/ConventionRighLsPersonsWithDisa
bilities.aspx.
248. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "AbandonedLove". The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney
on the Intersection Between InternationalHuman Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121 (2011).
249. Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights
to Participatein Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256 (2009).
250. Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26
LAw CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008).

251. Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights
of Personswith Disabilitiesto Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2011).
252. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,supra note 240,
art. 3(a), at 5.
253. Id. art. 3(b), at5.
254. Id. art. 15, at 12.
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abuse, '' 2 5 and a fight to protection of the "integrity of the
person. ' 256 It not only clarifies that states should not discriminate
against persons with disabilities, but also explicitly sets out the
many steps that states must take to create an enabling
environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic
equality in society. 257 The CRPD mandates that "States Parties shall
take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their
legal capacity." 25" Elsewhere, the Convention commands:
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice
for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with
others, including through the provision of
procedural and age-appropriate accommodations,
in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and
indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all
legal proceedings, including at investigative and
259
other preliminary stages.
Other articles in the CRPD speak directly to the questions
under consideration in this paper. The Convention requires, by
way of example, that "States Parties shall promote appropriate
training for those working in the field of administration of justice,
including police and prison staff.' ' 26 In an important article about
the relationship of the CRPD to prison conditions,Janet Lord also
focuses on Article 15 that mandates, as noted above, the right to
"freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. 261 Lord notes that "conditions within prisons and

255. Id. art. 16, at 12.
256. Id. art. 17, at 13.
257. See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 85, at 15 (discussing, inter alia, Bryan Y. Lee,
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary
Civil Commitment of Individuals with DevelopmentalDisabilities,44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
393, 413-30 (2011) (discussing the changes that ratifying states need to make in their
domestic involuntary civil commitment laws to comply with CRPD mandates)).
258. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,supra note 240,
art. 12(3), at 10.
259. Id.art. 13(1),atll.
260. Id. art. 13(2),at 11.
261. Lord, supranote 136, at 54.
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other institutional settings have long been the subject of scrutiny
by disability organizations." 262
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the CRPD
provides an affirmative right to health care, finding that member
States must:
(a) Provide persons with disabilities with the same
range, quality and standard of free or affordable
health care and programmes as provided to other
persons, including in the area of sexual and
reproductive health and population-based public
health programmes;
(b) Provide those health services needed by persons
with disabilities specifically because of their
disabilities, including early identification and
intervention as appropriate, and services designed
to minimize and prevent further disabilities,
including among children and older persons;
(c) Provide these health services as close as possible
to people's own communities, including in rural
areas;
(d) Require health professionals to provide care of
the same quality to persons with disabilities as to
others, including on the basis of free and informed
consent by, inter alia, raising awareness of the
human rights, dignity, autonomy and needs of
persons with disabilities through training and the
promulgation of ethical standards for public and
private health care;
(e) Prohibit discrimination against persons with
disabilities in the provision of health insurance, and
life insurance where such insurance is permitted by
national law, which shall be provided in a fair and
reasonable manner; [and]

262.

Id. at 69.
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(f) Prevent discriminatory denial of health care or
health services or food and fluids on the basis of
26 3
disability.

The ratification of the CRPD marks the most important
development ever seen in institutional human rights law for
persons with mental disabilities. 264 The CRPD is detailed,
comprehensive, integrated, and is the result of a careful drafting
process. It seeks to reverse the results of centuries of oppressive
behavior and attitudes that have stigmatized persons with
disabilities. 26 5 Its goals are clear: to promote, protect, and ensure

the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect
for their inherent dignity. 266 Whether these goals can actually be
accomplished is still far from a settled matter.
Professor Meghan Flynn has argued that these Articles
"guarantee persons with disabilities rights to enjoy freedom from
institutionalization and live in the community setting of their
choice. '267 If Professor Flynn is correct-as we believe she isthen, clearly, continuity of care must be considered as a
fundamental right under the CRPD. In an earlier article about
juvenile punishment facilities, one of the co-authors has argued
that "our current system of warehousing juveniles with mental
illnesses in juvenile detention facilities and reformatories and in
prisons following pre-adjudication transfers violates international
268
human rights law, including, but not limited to, the CRPD.
This analysis applies equally to the cohort that we discuss in this
paper.
263. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,supra note 240,
art. 25; see Paul Harpur, Old Age Is Not Just Impairment: The CRPD and the Need for a
Convention on Older Persons, 37 U. PA.J. INT'L L. 1027, 1045-46 (2016).
264. See, e.g., Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 85, at 31, n.187.
265. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,supra note 240,
art. 8, at 8.
266. Id. art. 1, at 4.
267. Meghan Flynn, Olmstead Plans Revisited: Lessons Learnedfrom the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,28 LAW & INEQ. 407, 424 (2010).
268. Michael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun" The International
Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46
TEX. TECH L. REv. 301, 306 (2013); see also Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, "Tollingfor
the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked": TherapeuticJurisprudenceand InternationalHuman
Rights Law As Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 231 (2008).
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Historically, there has traditionally been robust literature
about the relationship between correctional facilities and
international human rights law. 269 But there has, to this date, been
no scholarship at all that considers the application of international
human rights law to the need for continuity of care that we discuss
in this paper. A consideration of the relevant Articles of the CRPD
makes it clear that our current policies (not providing the sort of
continuity of care that would protect the persons in question from
"exploitation, violence and abuse," 27 0 and not guaranteeing the
right to protection of the "integrity of the person") 271 violate
international human rights law. If we are to provide "authentic
equality" 272 to this population so that they can truly "enjoy
freedom
from
institutionalization ,"273
then
we
must
reconceptualize these policies and provide the sort of continuity
of care that we urge here. An important article some fifteen years
ago by the former Director of the National Institute of Justice and
his colleagues asked, "Has the health care system in prison created
linkages with the health care system in the returning prisoner's
community to ensure continuity of care?"2 74 If we cannot answer
this question today in the affirmative (and we cannot), then we fail
under prevailing international human rights law standards.27 5

269. See, e.g., AlvinJ. Bronstein &Jenni Gainsborough, The InternationalContext of U.S.
Prison Reform: Using InternationalHuman Rights Laws and Standardsfor U.S. PrisonReform,
24 PACE L. REV. 811, 814-15 (2004); Fellner, supra note 57, at 405-10; Sara A. Rodriguez,
The Impotence of Being Earnest: Status of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners in Europe and the United States, 33 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 61, 62 (2007); see also Kathryn D. DeMarco, Disabled by Solitude: The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on The Use of Supermax
Solitary Confinement, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 523 (2012) (surveying the application of the
CRPD to solitary confinement in correctional institutions).
270. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,supra note 240,
art. 16, at 12.
271. Id. art. 17, at 13.
272. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 85, at 15.
273. Flynn, supra note 267, at 424.
274. Jeremy Travis et al., PrisonerReentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, 17 CRIM. JUST.
12, 14 (Spring 2002).
275. In addition to the CRPD, there are other international human rights instruments
relevant to this question. See, e.g., Danielle Drissel, Massachusetts Prison Mental Health
Services: History, Policy and Recommendations, 87 MASS. L. REV. 106, 107-08 (2003)
(discussing the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners); Dlugacz &
Droubi, supra note 30, at 141-42 (discussing the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
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Writing about the plight of incarcerated women in
California, Angela Wolf and her colleagues have recommended
that "[c] ommunity programs should link to in-prison programs to
provide continuity of care so as to meet women's basic needs upon
release, such as subsistence, shelter, and health care." 76 Each of
these is mandated by the CRPD 277 and as such, policies that do not
include a robust continuity-of-care program thus violate the
document.
IX. WAYS TO IMPROVE CONTINUITY OF CARE

There are many ways that the quality of continuity of care
can be improved. Initially, diversion programs keep persons with
mental illness away from the criminal justice system and instead
place them on special mental health-oriented tracks.2 7 ' Diversion
can occur at various stages including prior to arrest or after
arrest. 279 Certainly, well-operating MHCs2 s° are a proven means of
improving diversion, leading to better outcomes for the cohort of
individuals involved.2 8'
Additionally, providing mental health screening for every
arrestee can lead to that person being diverted into mental health
treatment. 2 2 The initial intake interview is a critical component of
effective mental health treatment as it allows officials to ascertain
whether the person was receiving treatment in the community,

276. Angela Wolf et al., The Incarcerationof Women in California,43 U.S.F. L. REv. 139,
166 (2008).
277. See, e.g., Harpur, supra note 251, at 1045-46 (health); Michael Ashley Stein &
Janet E. Lord, Enabling Refugee and IDP Law and Policy: Implications of the U.N.Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 28 ARIZ.J.INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 429 n.166 (2011)
("It should be noted that the CRPD emphasizes universal design as a concept to be
applied across all contexts covered by the treaty, which would include all housing,
including
temporary
shelter
designed
for
use
in
humanitarian
crisis
contexts."(interpreting United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
supra note 240, art. 4(1) (t))); see also Harpur, supra note 251, at 1051 (discussing, in an
international human rights context, Peter Townsend, Policies for the Aged in the 21st
Century: More 'Structured Dependency'or the Realization of Human Rights?, 26 AGING & SOC'Y
161, 165 (2006) (arguing that the plight of millions of older people in many developed
countries is rooted in the evolution of social policy, not old age itself)).
278. Howell, supra note 74, at 32.
279. Id.
280. See supraSection VII.
281. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 237.
282. See, e.g., Christy P. Johnson, Mental Health Care Policies in Jail Systems: Suicide and
the Eighth Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227 (2002).
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and also connects inmates with treatment, especially in those cases
where they were not receiving adequate treatment in the
community. 211 Mental health screening should be validated to
accurately identify mental illness. 284 The intake process should be
formulated to identify how a prisoner's areas of need overlap, such
as mental illness and unemployment or educational issues. 8 5
Mental health screenings should also be administered routinely
upon any transfer between prisons, upon admission to a
segregation unit within a prison, and also on an ad-hoc basis. 28 6 In
addition, mental health screening should include assessment of
28
suicidal risk.

7

Improving conditions in prisons and jails can also improve
continuity of care for persons with mental illness.28 8 Proper mental
health training for corrections officers can also help identify
inmates should they need mental health treatment during their
incarceration and ensure that the interactions between staff and
inmates with mental illness are therapeutic. 289 Punitive treatment
like segregation and use of restraints should be eliminated.2 90 In
addition, psychiatric rehabilitation programs are needed
including education and vocational training, social skills training,
treatment.2 91
abuse
substance
management, and
anger
Intermediate care, between inpatient and outpatient treatment, is
29 2
also a crucial component.
Beyond this, discharge planning is also an important point
to ensure that a person continues to receive proper mental health
care in the community. 29' Discharge plans must be tailored
294
towards individual needs and must be culturally relevant.
Aftercare programs are not always adequate or sufficient, and it is

283. Broches, supra note 9, at 101.
284. Matti Hautala, In the Shadow of Sandra Bland: The Importance of Mental Health
Screening in U.S.Jails, 21 TEX.J. ON C.L. & C.R. 89,120 (2015).
285. Colgan, supra note 204, at 310.
286. Terry A. Kupers, A Community Mental Health Model in Corrections, 26 STAN. L. &
POL'YREV. 119, 130 (2015).
287. Fellner, supra note 88, at 142.
288. Id.
289. Howell, supra note 74, at 33.
290. Hautala, supra note 284, at 122.
291. Kupers, supra note 286, at 134.
292. Id.
293. Broches, supra note 9, at 110.
294. Lamb & Bachrach, supra note 64, at 1043.
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important that inmates work with discharge planners for longer
periods of time prior to release in order to ensure a smooth
transition. 295 Comprehensive transitional services provide access to
mental health treatment, job opportunities, family unification,
and cognitive skills training.2 1 It is also important to make sure
the individual has the ability to pay for mental health services and
2 97
medication upon release.
Finally, the availability and quality of community mental
health treatment should be improved to address continuity of care
issues.2 9 The key to quality and effective mental health care is the
relationship between the provider and the consumer receiving
services. 299 Increasing the availability of educational and vocational
training and mental health and substance use treatment increases
the chance of successful reentry and reduces recidivism." 0 The
first days and weeks that an inmate is released are crucial in that
the inmate poses the most danger to themselves, their families,
and peers. m By investing greater resources in using this
vulnerable time to achieve socially desirable outcomes, public
health workers can interrupt the cycle of relapse and recidivism." 2
Of course, more research is still needed to determine the most
effective social interventions.0 3
X. CONCLUSION

The right to continuity of care is guaranteed under both
domestic and international law. Providing effective continuity of
care for persons with mental illness can lead to better outcomes
and reduce the shuttle of this population between jails and
hospitals. However, there are many factors complicating the issue

295. Howell, supra note 74, at 34.
296. Colgan, supra note 204, at 318.
297. Shane Levesque, Closing the Door: Mental Illness, the CriminalJusticeSystem, and the
Need for a Uniform MentalHealth Policy, 34 NOVA L. REV. 711, 738 (2010).
298. See, e.g., Domenico Giacco & Stefan Priebe, Using Routine Quality ofLife Assessment
to Improve Effectiveness of Community Mental Health Care, in BEYOND ASSESSMENT OF QUALITY
OF LIFE IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 145 (A. George Awad & Lakshmi N.P Voruganti eds., 2016).
299. Miriam Ruttenberg, Choice and Continuity of Care As Significant Issues for Equality in
Mental Health Care, 10J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 201, 205 (2014).
300. Colgan, supra note 204, at 322.
301. Freudenberg, supra note 24, at 227.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 228.
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of continuity of care with no easy solutions. Currently the constant
shuttling treatment of the current, relevant population is in
violation of the ADA, the CRPD, and therapeutic jurisprudence
principles. The ADA guarantees freedom from discrimination
based on disability and applies both to persons in the community
and individuals who are incarcerated, guaranteeing a right to
continuity of care. Yet individuals also have a right to medical
privacy, as HIPAA prevents medical information from being
shared except in certain prescribed circumstances. Furthermore,
although the ACA has greatly expanded access to health care, it
currently does not apply to incarcerated individuals. Health
insurance can complicate issues of continuity of care in cases
where only certain treatment providers or medications are covered
for the individual.
Continuity of care can be improved through interventions
through the use of MHCs, diversion practices, mental health
screening, and, potentially, the use of psychiatric advance
directives. More research is needed to determine what
interventions work best for this population. Better training for
corrections employees, court personnel, lawyers, judges, and
police officers can lead to better therapeutic outcomes."°4
Our title comes in part from Bob Dylan's masterpiece
Visions of Johanna. Writing about that song, Tim Riley has
characterized it as "rich with psychological peril."" °5 Critic Mike
Marqusee has characterized Visions as "Dylan's definitive
treatment of 'strandedness."' 3 6 The cohort of individuals we write
about here are in persistent "psychological peril," and, whether
they are in a correctional facility, a hospital or on the street, they
are "stranded" from society. 307 No one, in many instances, is even
"pretending to care for [them] .,"3o We hope that our suggestions
here may ameliorate this set of circumstances in the future.
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